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POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ON U.S. AID
TO JORDAN

THESIS

Connie L. Strobbe
Second Lieutenant, USAF

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The 1979 Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Iran resulted in the replacement of the pro-U.S. monarchy of the Shah with the theocracy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which repudiated all Iranian/U.S. security agreements, radically changing the equations of influence in the Mid-East. The Iranian revolution was an expression of a resurgence of Islamic religious zeal throughout the area, a fundamentalist revival which threatens all Arab nations which support U.S. policy, especially vis-a-vis Israel. Fundamentalists, encouraged by the success of Khomeini, have pledged to support their religious brothers by all means available to them, including terrorism, assassination, and war. Jordan, absolutely essential to any possible Arab/Israeli accommodation because of its geopolitical position and historic association with the Palestinian people, is militarily extremely weak and financially dependent upon aid from nations themselves threatened by fundamentalism. Jordan's financial and military vulnerability coupled with its political fragility make it a prime target for radical Islamic destabilization. At present, Jordan, incapable of independent foreign policy, will continue under anti-U.S. pressures unless the U.S. develops a clearer understanding of the religious/political situation in the Mid-East and devises a security assistance program for Jordan which recognizes the value and vulnerability of that nation. This will require an increase of \$400-700 million a year in FMS credits and economic aid for ten years, as well as a re-assessment of the traditional unconditional U.S. support of Israeli-perceived military requirements.

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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ON U.S. AID
TO JORDAN

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

Connie L. Strobbe, B.S.

Second Lieutenant, USAF

March 1984

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

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Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgments	ii
I. Introduction	1
Purpose of the Study	1
Scope and Limitations	3
Justification	3
Research Questions	4
Literature Review	5
Plan of Presentation	5
II. History of the Islamic Religion	7
Introduction	7
Basic Islamic Beliefs	8
Islamic History	9
Major Islamic Factions	13
Current Islamic Resurgence	15
Summary	19
III. History of Jordan	21
Introduction	21
Creation of Jordan	21
The PLO and the Six Day War	30
Jordanian-Arab Relations	32
Summary	35
IV. Jordanian Vulnerabilities	36
Introduction	36
Jordanian Perception of Mid-East Threats	36
Jordan's Military Status	39
Jordan's Financial Status	40
Jordan's Foreign Policy Goals	43
U.S.-Jordanian Relations	45
Islamic Fundamentalism and Jordan	47
Summary	51
V. Key Mid-East Players	52
Introduction	52

	Page
History of U.S. Mid-East Policy	53
Oil and U.S. Mid-East Policy	60
Current U.S. Mid-East Policy	62
The Arab Perception	65
The PLO	67
The Israeli Perception	69
Soviet Aims in the Mid-East	71
Jordan's Role	74
Islamic Resurgence and Jordan	76
Summary	79
 VI. Recommendations and Conclusions	 80
Analysis	80
Recommendations	84
Conclusions	89
Research Question One	89
Research Question Two	90
Research Question Three	92
 Appendix: UN Resolution 242	 93
 Bibliography	 95
 Vita	 100

POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM ON U.S. AID TO JORDAN

I. Introduction

Purpose of the Study

The volatile Middle East is in a constant state of political upheaval. In January 1979 the Shah of Iran was forced to leave his country by a strict sect of Shi'ite Muslims led by the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, who later replaced the Shah as ruler of Iran. The Ayatollah sharply reduced Iranian oil production, and, more importantly, set out to spread Iran's fundamentalist resurgence. Iran's actions have posed a definite threat to Mid East stability, largely because of the example it set for fundamentalist groups in other Arab nations.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian groups have created further tension and instability in the region. These groups were formed in response to the creation of Israel by Western nations, a move which left the Palestinians without a home. Serious problems existed between Palestinians and Jews since 1933 when increasing numbers of Jews moved to Palestine to escape the rising anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany. However, these problems escalated after Israel was officially formed.

Numerous conflicts exist among the Arab nations as well.

The left-wing Ba'ath political party in Iraq opposes the right-wing Ba'ath movement in Syria and has been linked to revolutionary activities in moderate nations such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In 1980 fighting broke out between Iran and Iraq. This war soon extended its influence far beyond the borders of these two nations and has led to some temporary alliances among former enemies.

Jordan, ruled by the moderate King Hussein, has long been viewed by the United States as a stabilizing force in a frequently unstable region. Jordan has sent aid to Iraq in its war with Iran, and Hussein continues his efforts to control Muslim fundamentalist groups in his nation. King Hussein has so far rejected invitations by the United States to participate in the Mid East peace talks with Israel. There will continue to be unrest in the Middle East until some type of settlement is reached between Israel and the Arab nations, and it is believed that Jordan's participation in the peace talks would encourage other Arab countries to recognize the validity of these talks. However, to participate in talks with Israel would place King Hussein in a vulnerable position and would definitely leave him open to attacks from Muslim fundamentalist groups.

This thesis will examine the history of the Islamic religion in an attempt to explain how Islam affects the present situation in the Middle East. It will also examine Jordan's history and its relationships with Western nations. However, the main focus of this thesis is to determine how Muslim fundamentalist groups impact Jordan, and the effect which an

Islamic resurgence in Jordan would have on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Scope and Limitations

Volumes of material have been written on both the Islamic religion and Jordan. The purpose of this thesis is not to reproduce everything ever written on these subjects, and in fact only those events which are necessary to understand the present situation in the Middle East will be covered. Further information on the Islamic religion can be obtained from Dessouki, Enayat, and Dekmejian, and Jordan's history and current status are covered in more depth by Nyrop, Teleki, and Cutter.

Justification

The Yom Kippur War and oil embargo of 1973 led to an "energy crisis" in the United States, Europe, and Japan which had a devastating effect on the world economy. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) began a long series of price increases which demonstrated the ability of the Arab nations to take concerted economic action and the dependence of the Western world on OPEC's oil. For the first time oil was used as a political tool to coerce the United States to reduce aid to Israel and to alter its regional foreign policy. U.S. policy has long supported Israel, a fact which has caused strained relations between the U.S. and Arab nations. Therefore it has been in the best interest of the United States to

negotiate a peaceful settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

President Reagan's 1982 peace initiative for the Middle East calls for "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan" (16:59). In order for this plan to work, Jordan must be convinced to join in peace negotiations with Israel. Jordan has refused to talk with Israel due to a fear of reprisals by other Arab states, the PLO, and Muslim fundamentalist groups. Furthermore, Jordan is weak militarily and wants a greater commitment from the United States before it will negotiate with Israel.

King Hussein would also place himself in a personally vulnerable position if he agreed to talk with Israel. In the past King Hussein has frequently been threatened by Muslim fundamentalist groups, and if he decides to participate in Mid East peace talks this threat will increase substantially. It is important for the United States to examine now what the affect would be on U.S. foreign policy if King Hussein were killed or exiled. If Jordan became dominated by Muslim fundamentalists what would be the chances of an Arab-Israeli peace, and how would it affect other Arab nations and U.S. relations with these nations?

Research Questions

1. How do the political/social aspects of Islam affect the political stability of Jordan?
2. What effect would a resurgence of Islamic

fundamentalism in Jordan have on U.S. Defense Assistance to Jordan?

3. What effect would a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan have on U.S. Mid-East foreign policy?

Literature Review

In reviewing existing literature numerous sources were found to answer question one. Books and articles by Dekmejian, Ahmed, Woolacott, and Dessouki were extremely useful in gaining insight into the Islamic religion. Nyrop and Teleki gave a detailed history of Jordan, and were useful in explaining Jordan's present position. Previous theses and studies by Chabbi, Conlin, and Luce were helpful in filling in gaps and providing insight into the relationship between the Islamic religion and Arab politics.

Plan of Presentation

Chapter 1. The Introduction gives the Purpose of the Study, Scope and Limitations, Justification, Research Questions, Literature Review, and Plan of Presentation.

Chapter 2. History of the Islamic Religion gives a brief history of Islam, its basic beliefs, the Sunni-Shiia split, and the impact of Islam on a nation's government and foreign policy.

Chapter 3. History of Jordan gives the highlights of Jordan's history and its relationships with Western nations, Israel, and its Arab neighbors.

Chapter 4. Jordanian Vulnerabilities gives the major

threats to Jordan's stability, Jordan's military and financial status, and Jordan's foreign policy goals and ties with the United States.

Chapter 5. Key Mid East Players gives the major groups and nations with interests in the Middle East, their perceptions of events in the area, and how their regional goals conflict.

Chapter 6. Recommendations and Conclusions summarizes the major findings of this study and gives recommendations for U.S. Mid East policy.

II. History of the Islamic Religion

Introduction

The Islamic religion was founded in 622 A.D. by the prophet Muhammad. Originating in Mecca on the western part of the Arabian Peninsula, it soon spread, and today is the dominant religion in nations on several continents. An estimated 20% of the world population adheres to the Islamic or Muslim faith (75:39). The Muslim faith considers church and state a single entity, and Muslim nations are thus strongly influenced by the Qur'an, the sacred book of Islam, and by religious scholars (14:11). Obviously Islam is a potent political force which must be studied and understood by Western nations, particularly those with national security interests in the Middle East.

A division occurred in the Muslim world in 661 A.D. during the reign of the fourth successor after Muhammad. This division created two major Islamic groups, the Shi'a and the Sunni, each having somewhat different political ideologies and goals. Again, it is important for Western nations to understand the differences between Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims since these differences affect the political structure of nations dominated by each group. Sunni Muslims are the most moderate, least anti-Western of the Muslim groups and can thus be dealt with diplomatically in a different manner than the Shi'ites, who are typically more fundamentalist and anti-Western in

doctrine (75:40).

Basic Islamic Beliefs

At the center of Islamic religion is the belief in one God who created the universe and provides guidance to his people through revelations to a select group of prophets. According to Islam, the greatest of these prophets was Muhammad, whose revelations are written in the Qur'an (69:145). The Qur'an is believed to have been revealed to Muhammad by the Angel Gabriel, and it may not be altered. It differs from the Christian bible in that it specifically deals with matters of civil and criminal law, providing guidance on marriage, divorce, and child custody, and describing proper penalties for such crimes as robbery, murder, and rape (30:541).

The Islam religion also recognizes the revelations of a number of other prophets, many of whom are also revered by Judaism and Christianity. All of the prophets of the Old Testament of the Jewish/Christian bible are accepted, and special recognition is given to the prophet Abraham. Islam also reveres Jesus Christ as a prophet second only to Muhammad himself (2:26).

According to Islam, Jews and Christians believe in the same God that the Islamic faith does. However, Jews and Christians have fallen out of strict obedience to God's law. Hence, they are not on the same spiritual and social level as Muslims. In spite of this difference, they are due a certain amount of respect because they are mentioned in the revelations

handed down by God to his prophets (2:26; 41:41).

The Muslim faith, unlike many religions, does not recognize or support the separation of church and state. Each Muslim nation is supposed to act in accordance with Islamic beliefs in domestic and international affairs. For this reason the religious leader (caliph) in most Muslim countries also serves as the nation's political leader. This precedent was established by Muhammad, who was not only a religious leader but a soldier and head of state. Modern caliphs of different nations are required by Islamic religious law to work together and to project a united front in foreign affairs (75:44).

Islamic History

The sixth century after the birth of Christ was a time of great social and economic change on the Arabian peninsula. The two largest empires in the area, the Byzantine and Sassanid, were losing the power to protect their trade routes. Arab towns were thus able to charge caravans large fees for safe passage across their land. Old Arab tribal values of loyalty, generosity, and hospitality began to vanish, replaced by materialism and pride in one's wealth (2:24; 20:52).

At this time the prophet Muhammad was born, the son of Abdullah and Amina of the tribe of Quraysh. Since both of his parents died by the time Muhammad was six, he was raised by his grandfather and uncle. When he was older Muhammad obtained a job directing trade for a wealthy widow named Khadija whom he later married. Khadija was to be his greatest supporter until

her death at the age of 65 (2:25; 40:19).

Muhammad received his first revelation when he was forty years old. According to Islamic beliefs, the first words which were revealed to him were "You are the messenger of God", and these are therefore the first words in the Qur'an (2:25). He continued to receive revelations until his death in 632 A.D. Muhammad began preaching in Mecca in 610 A.D. He spoke against the emphasis on personal wealth, and encouraged people to actively help others and to share their wealth. He preached an egalitarian philosophy, emphasizing the brotherhood of all men (75:41).

Muhammad attracted a growing number of followers to this position. However, these same views alarmed the mercantile class in Mecca, which, enjoying its new found wealth, had no intention of sharing its prosperity. This conflict soon led to the persecution of Muhammad and his followers in Mecca (40:23). When the level of persecution in Mecca eventually became unacceptable, Muhammad and his followers emigrated in 622 A.D. to Medina, an oasis 200 miles north of Mecca (20:54; 59:10). This migration is generally recognized as the beginning of the Muslim religion. Muhammad continued to gain an ever increasing number of converts after his move to Medina, and within ten years he had totally changed the political and religious composition of the Arabian peninsula (2:26).

Muhammad died in 632 A.D., and a question arose as to who should succeed him. Abu Bakr was eventually elected as the Muslim's new caliph or religious leader. However, some Muslims

believed that this position should have gone to Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law. This dispute eventually led to a division within the Islamic religion (69:146; 40:36; 59:18; 72:66).

During the reign of the second and third caliphs the Muslims forcibly established a tremendous empire in the Middle East and Northern Africa, but the acquisition of new territory proved to be a mixed blessing. While the new lands substantially increased the number of Islamic followers, it also created serious problems (3:9; 55:27). The Qur'an was designed to address the problems encountered among tribal societies on the Arabian peninsula, and it did not address many new situations which they encountered when they expanded into new territory containing older, more complex societies (2:26).

More basic problems also arose when the Muslims conquered new territory. For example, cultural diversity increased greatly, as did the number of languages and dialects spoken by Muslims. This diversity naturally decreased the cohesiveness of the Muslim world. The different cultures and languages also affected the Muslim's political unity, which had begun to deteriorate by the ninth century. The caliphs were no longer able to maintain control over the distant regions of their empire (69:147; 72:28).

In spite of its numerous difficulties, Islam continued to spread deep into Africa, in Central Asia, and in the nations bordering the Indian Ocean. Islamic teachers and political leaders became more flexible in order to adapt to new social and political conditions. Some areas became more liberal in their

interpretation of the Qur'an, while others remained conservative and continued to insist on literal interpretations of the Islamic law (69:148). By the eighteenth century the Muslim empire had become fragmented due to the different lines to development followed in different regions of the empire. Tensions developed between the liberals, conservatives, and fundamentalists (19:6). To complicate matters, the economic center of the world had shifted to Western Europe, thus eroding the economic importance of the Muslim world (74:31). European military technology expanded far more rapidly than Muslim technology, and Muslim fundamentalists and conservatives were unwilling to adopt the European advances. This led to a tremendous imbalance in military power which placed the Muslim world in a vulnerable position (5:148; 3:12; 41:97).

The weak military and economic condition of the Muslim world resulted in its domination by the European powers during the nineteenth century (3:12; 24:163). The Muslim reaction to this domination can be divided into three distinct phases. During phase one, (c.1800-1900) most Muslims experienced a sense of shock and despair at being defeated and subjugated by the Western powers. Muslim nations eventually realized that military weakness led to their defeat, so they began a number of military reforms, adopting European technology and training (22:18)

During the second phase of Muslim reaction to European domination (c1900-1950) many Muslims saw the need for basic changes in the social and political structures of their nations

before effective military reforms could succeed. Supporters of this view were usually pro-Western, encouraging the adoption of Western culture, dress, and ideas. These pro-Westerners were a small but very powerful, elite minority of the Muslim population. This group usually consisted of the middle and upper class urban workers who were literate and fairly well educated. Therefore, Western ideas and culture were adopted only by the well-to-do urban elite, while the remainder of the population continued to follow traditional Muslim customs and beliefs (22:18).

During the third phase of Muslim reaction to European domination (c.1950 to the present) Muslims began again to appreciate their cultural heritage, and to reject Western culture (22:18). The extent of this reaction varies from country to country, depending upon the strength of the local fundamentalists.

Major Islamic Factions

After the death of Muhammad the Islamic world became divided into two major sects. The Shi'ites believed that only direct descendents of Muhammad (through his daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali) could become Muslim caliphs. The Sunni, on the other hand, believed that a caliph should be elected, chosen for his outstanding leadership characteristics (58:19; 71:66).

Present day Sunni and Shi'ites, interpret the Qur'an differently and therefore have different reactions to the Western world. The Sunni Muslims, also known as Orthodox

Muslims, comprise more than 85 per cent of the Muslim world. They form a majority in most Arab countries, including Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. The Sunni are the most moderate, least anti-Western of the Muslim groups. Even in those countries where the Sunni do not form a majority, they are typically the ruling class (75:40).

Currently about 90 million Muslims are Shi'ites, and they form a majority in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Bahrain. The Shi'ites are the most fundamentalist, anti-Western of the Muslim groups, and it is Shi'ite Muslims who have been responsible for a number of revolutions and protests in the Middle East and Africa (75:40).

In most Shi'ite Muslim nations the priests have a well defined hierarchy which enables them to centralize their power. They are politically stronger because they have managed to avoid fragmenting their power and have instead concentrated it in a few key individuals. Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran where the Ayatollah Khomeini is the central authority figure (75:44).

The differences are now diminishing somewhat between the Sunni and the Shi'ites, and the two groups are no longer as distant as they once were. The reason for this is partly economic. Oil revenues in the Arab world have increased the gap between the wealthy and the poor. This has tended to unite the poorer Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. The other major factor uniting the Arab Muslims is their mutual opposition to the existence of Israel (75:44).

Current Islamic Resurgence

Islamic resurgence has been defined by Dessouki as:

an increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments and opposition groups alike. It designates a politicized, activist form of Islam and the growing use of Islamic symbolism and legitimation at the level of political action . . . We are not dealing with calls for or attempts to provide a new interpretation of Quran but, rather, with social and political movements that are engaged in mobilization, organization, and possibly the seizure of political authority. Thus, Islamic resurgence refers to the increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic ideologies and symbols in Muslim societies and in the public life of Muslim individuals (19:4).

Periodic resurgences of Islamic fundamentalism have occurred throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, usually in response to changes taking place within individual nations. Generally these changes involved the government's adoption of outside values or ideas. When they felt that the government had gone too far in compromising Islamic values, Islamic fundamentalists generally demanded a reassertion of the Islamic faith. This resistance to change has created a tremendous amount of tension in both past and present Islamic nations which have attempted to adopt Western ideas, culture, or industry.

The first significant Islamic resurgence occurred in Saudi Arabia in the 1700's. This resurgence resulted from a desire to purify the Islamic faith of outside influence caused by an association with the Ottoman Turks and the Mediterranean countries (2:23). Two other significant Islamic resurgence

movements occurred in Sudan and Iran at the end of the nineteenth century. The resurgence in Sudan resulted from a fundamentalist backlash against the current Turkey-Egyptian rule . This foreign rule was seen as a threat to the Islamic faith. The resurgence movement in Iran was the result of protest over an unfavorable economic deal which the current Shah had concluded with a European investor. This resurgence accompanied growing nationalism among the Muslim nations in general (22:16).

Several causes exist for the current Islamic fundamentalist resurgence occurring in many Muslim nations. One of the most important causes is the rapid technological advances which are presently being made world wide. These advances have had an effect in one way or another on almost everyone. The rapid pace at which technological advances have occurred has created a sense of uncertainty in many people, and in response they turn to traditional values and religion (75:44). In the United States this has resulted in a revival of fundamentalist Christian groups, but in the Arab world the religion to which people turn is Islam.

The other major cause of the present fundamentalist Islamic resurgence is the massive influx of oil money into the Arab world. This tremendous oil revenue has caused a great disparity in wealth between the upper and lower economic classes. The vast majority of the people are poor, and they have retaliated against the wealthy minority by attacking the outward signs of their wealth and by demanding a return to the egalitarian Islamic fundamentals (75:44).

In many Muslim nations the Islamic resurgence is also an expression of strong anti-American sentiment, and three main reasons have been cited for this. First, the United States is much more active and prominent in the Middle East than other Western nations. Second, due to its leadership the U.S. has come to represent Western culture and a consumeristic, wasteful lifestyle. Third, the U.S. has continued to provide extensive support to Israel (75:44).

One of the most important resurgence movements in this century was the formation of the Muslim Brothers by Hasan al-Banna, a religious teacher in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in the late 20s or early 30s, primarily as a religious and social organization. However, after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936, the Brotherhood became politically active, took up the Palestinian cause, and opposed British rule in the Mid East. The Brotherhood then spread to other Arab countries and had soon raised a sizable army. Egyptian Prime Minister Nograshi Pasha saw the Brotherhood as a threat so he dissolved the organization in 1948, confiscated its property, and arrested the leading members. A short time later Pasha was assassinated (14:14).

The Brotherhood was again legalized in Egypt in 1951 and was allowed to operate until January 1954 when they were dissolved for a short period of time. Relations improved so the Brotherhood was reinstated until October 1954 when one of its members almost assassinated President Nasser. Nasser responded by having over 1000 of the Brothers arrested and six

of them executed. The Brotherhood has since remained illegal in Egypt. However, it continues to function underground in Egypt and to operate openly in Jordan, the only country which presently allows the Brotherhood to legally exist, 'the better to keep an eye on them' (73:30; 14:15).

The most well known recent example of a large scale Islamic fundamentalist resurgence occurred in Iran. Before this resurgence Iran had attempted to "modernize" and to adopt Western culture. However, the changes did not affect all levels of society equally, and the result was a highly fragmented country. The government at this time was viewed by the people as highly ineffective and corrupt, and no apparent effort was made to unite the different social and economic classes. As the class conflict increased, the government relied more heavily on coercion and force to maintain control of the country. This force acted to unite the poor and the new urban working classes, both of whom were increasingly attracted to Islamic fundamentalism (18:169). This group eventually united behind the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shi'ite Muslim who assumed both political and religious control of the country.

The revolution in Iran is significant for a number of reasons. It was definitely anti-American in nature, and it thus weakened the U.S. military position in the Middle East. Also, it created added tension in an already volatile area. Many nations fear that Muslim fundamentalists in their country may take the Ayatollah's success as a call to action. Perhaps the most significant effect of this power shift is that it reestablished

Islam as a potent political force.

The factors which led to the Islamic resurgence and subsequent revolution in Iran are present in several other Muslim nations. Many Muslim countries have come to rely on an increasing use of force to maintain control. Class conflict has also increased in many areas due to the growing disparity between the economic classes. Political corruption and ineffective leadership have added to the tension and unrest, and it seems likely at this time that other countries will follow Iran's example (18:169).

Summary

The Islamic religion, founded in 622 A.D., today counts one out of every five people among its believers. According to the Qu'ran, the only function of a state is the protection and defense of its religion. Muslim nations are strongly influenced by the Qur'an and by religious scholars, although the degree of this influence varies in different countries. For example, the division in 661 A.D. between the Sunni and Shi'ites resulted in different social and political philosophies in nations dominated by each group.

The Islamic faith is presently undergoing a large scale fundamentalist resurgence. This has had a tremendous effect on the Middle East and Africa, and its influence has extended far beyond the boundaries of those nations directly involved. Many experts believe that the example set by Iran will be followed by other Muslim nations. This would undoubtedly upset the entire

power balance in the Middle East and is a situation which the United States should carefully analyze when making future defense plans.

III. History of Jordan

Introduction

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a small, Middle Eastern nation bordered by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel. Originally part of a Palestinian Mandate under British control, Jordan's independence was formally recognized in 1946. Since that time, Jordan has been involved in numerous conflicts with Israel, including the Six Day War which resulted in the loss of the West Bank.

Over half of Jordan's population is Palestinian, and this, combined with its location, has placed Jordan in a key position in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan is central to President Reagan's Mid East peace initiative and must be persuaded to enter peace negotiations with Israel if this or any other plan is to work. However, Jordan has been ostracized in the past when its actions towards Israel differed from those of its Arab neighbors, and the United States must realize that Jordan will be more isolated than ever if it begins negotiations with Israel. The United States must understand Jordan's position before they can be convinced to enter into peace negotiations with Israel.

Creation of Jordan

Separate Arab and Zionist movements developed during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The Arab movement

first appeared in Syria and Lebanon, with the objective of freeing Arabs from European domination and uniting them in an independent nation (10:11). The Zionist movement originated in Eastern Europe and received increased support after 1894 when journalist Theodor Herzl publicized the anti-Semitism aroused in France during the treason trial of a Jewish army officer. Herzl helped form the World Zionist Organization (WZO) with the intent of creating "for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law" (33:222).

The territory which forms present day Jordan was given to Great Britain as a zone of influence under the Sykes-Picot Treaty in May 1916 (60:110). This same territory was claimed by the Zionists as part of the Jewish National Home promised to them in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (61:22; 11:58). Syrian and Iraqi nationalists also claimed this land, and in March 1920 the General Syrian Congress included Jordan as part of its territory when it declared Syrian and Iraqi independence. This Congress named as kings of Syria and Iraq two sons of Hussein Ibn Ali al Hashimi, the grand sharif of Mecca and the custodian of the holy places. His son Faisal became king of Syria and Abdullah king of Iraq (28:77; 11:62; 30:569).

In April Britain received a Palestinian Mandate from the San Remo Conference. This Mandate brought Arabs and British and French into direct territorial conflict. Shortly after the San Remo Conference French troops captured Damascus and Faisal was temporarily exiled. At this time Abdullah went to Transjordan to get aid against the French. A few months later the

Palestinian Mandate was extended by an Anglo-French agreement to include Transjordan. This meant to the Zionists that Transjordan would become part of the Jewish National Home. However, the British had not honored all of their wartime agreements with the Arabs so an Anglo/Arab conference was held in Cairo which resulted in Faisal becoming king of Iraq. As compensation to Abdullah, he was made the nominal ruler of Transjordan (29:15; 28:78).

Transjordan at this time contained only 400,000 people, 20 percent of whom lived in four small towns. The new government led by Abdullah was entirely dependent on British foreign aid, and the British continued to control defense, financial, and foreign policy matters. However, Abdullah had control over most internal affairs. Transjordan made slow but steady progress in improving roads, communication, and education in spite of occasional tribal conflicts. In February 1928 a new treaty was signed with Great Britain which gave Transjordan significant new rights to self government. In April of that year a Constitution was written, and the following year a Legislative Council was formed (29:16).

On March 22, 1946 the Treaty of London was signed, formally recognizing Transjordan's independence from Britain, although provisions remained for British military and technical advisors to remain (61:26). A few months later Transjordan officially became a kingdom with Abdullah as the first king. A new constitution was written, and diplomatic ties were formed with Arab neighbors (29:17). Two years later another treaty

was signed with Britain which removed almost all restrictions on Transjordanian independence (60:217).

While Jordan was developing with few serious internal problems the same could not be said for Palestine. After 1933 the rising anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany caused an increased number of Jews to seek refuge in Palestine. This worried the Palestinian Arabs who reacted by forming a Supreme Arab Committee and going on strike to protest increased Jewish immigration (30:577). The British then formed the Peel Committee to decide what should be done with Palestine. This committee recommended dividing Palestine into two parts, one Arab and the other Jewish. This recommendation was firmly rejected by the Palestinian Arabs (61:25; 36:25). In March 1938 the British called a conference in London between the Jewish Agency and Arab representatives from Palestine and neighboring Arab nations. This conference failed because the Arabs refused to talk directly with the Jewish Agency. The Arabs viewed Palestine as an illegitimate state, one formed for convenience by the British in spite of promises made to Arab leaders. All early British publications had indicated that current inhabitants of Palestine would not be affected by an increased Jewish settlement. Indeed, several reports had recommended against the political subordination of the current Arab population (8:3).

In 1947 Britain took the Palestinian problem to the United Nations. The UN recommended dividing Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and giving Jerusalem special international

status. The Zionist General Council seemed willing to accept this plan, but the Arab Higher Committee totally rejected it. Violence in the area increased, and in January, 1948 Britain announced it was giving up its mandate over Palestine. In May Britain officially withdrew, and almost immediately Palestine was invaded by Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Except for the British trained Transjordanian units, the Arabs were largely ill-trained and inexperienced. Transjordan was therefore the only country able to capture and hold new territory (28:85; 46:47). The area captured by Transjordan, still referred to as the West Bank, nearly doubled the nation's population and agricultural land. On April 25, 1950 the West Bank was formally annexed by Transjordan.

In April 1949 Abdullah changed the name of his country to Jordan, and the following year elections were held which were very favorable for him. Although Abdullah was fairly successful at securing his position of power, his nation faced serious problems, many of which resulted from the war of 1948. Because of the war over one million Palestinian Arabs became refugees, and half of these settled in refugee camps in Jordan. The UN provided extensive aid in supporting these camps, however, Jordan faced the problem of preventing camp conditions from leading to civil unrest (24:189). Jordan also had to deal with hostility and isolation from its Arab neighbors who saw the annexation of the West Bank as a sign of Abdullah's greed. Jordan was further denounced by other Arab countries when it granted full citizenship rights to the Palestinian refugees. This was seen

as a willingness to accept the status quo instead of fighting to defeat Israel and regain the Palestinian homeland (29:17).

On July 20, 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian hired by one of his enemies who was angered by the annexation of the West Bank. A few minor demonstrations occurred after the assassination, but public order was soon restored, and the main question became who should succeed the king. Abdullah's oldest son, Prince Talal, was not mentally stable. However, it was believed that Abdullah would have favored him since it would make it easier for Talal's son, Hussein, to assume the throne. For this reason Prince Talal was chosen as the next king. Less than a year later he was asked by the Jordanian legislature to abdicate the throne to his son. He agreed, and since Hussein was still too young to rule, a regency council was named. Six months later when Hussein turned eighteen he returned from Britain where he had been attending school and took the constitutional oath as king (28:87; 46:55).

King Hussein faced serious problems during his first few years. Over half the people in his country were Palestinians who were far more radical than the conservative East Bank Jordanians who made up his cabinet. Even in his early days Hussein filled top government and army positions with beduin tribesmen whose families had proven loyalty to the monarchy (28:89). The coup d'etat by Nasser in Egypt and the spreading Arab nationalism made Hussein very suspicious of any radical elements in his country. Jordan became more conservative at a time when other Arab nations were becoming more radical

(28:90).

Jordanian Palestinians began to blame the U.S., Great Britain, and the Hashemites for the loss of their homeland. This made Jordan's financial ties to the U.S. and Britain even more unfavorable, and when Jordan's prime minister announced he was taking Jordan into the U.S. sponsored Baghdad Pact there were three days of massive riots. Although public order was restored, Prime Minister Hazza al Majali was prevented from signing the Baghdad Pact. This left Jordan once again isolated, not only from the U.S. but from its Arab neighbors who saw Jordan as only too willing to negotiate with Western powers (42:56).

Jordan continued to have border conflicts with Israel, and in October 1956 in response to a guerrilla raid Israelis attacked the West Bank village of Qualqilyah and killed forty-eight people. Jordan's Palestinians were outraged and demanded war. Jordan made military alliances with Syria and Egypt, and Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi, the National Socialist Party leader, began to mold his country after Egypt. Jordan became anti-Western and alligned itself with its Arab neighbors (42:60; 28:93).

On October 29, 1956 Israel invaded Egypt with British and French aid. Hussein wanted to send Jordanian troops to help Egypt, but Nasser realized that the war was already lost and refused Hussein's offer. Thus Jordan was not directly involved in the Second Arab-Israeli War, but because of Britain's aid to Israel, Jordan was almost forced to break its ties to Britain.

At a conference in Cairo early in 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement pledging Jordan \$35.8 million for the next ten years. Later that year a formal Anglo-Jordanian agreement was signed and Britain removed its troops from Jordan (42:61; 61:29).

In 1957 Hussein had problems with Prime Minister Nabulsi who had strong leanings towards Egypt. Nabulsi wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union so Jordan could buy arms from them as Egypt had done in 1955. Hussein also believed that Nabulsi planned to overthrow the monarchy so in April he demanded the resignation of the Nabulsi government (46:65; 28:94).

On April 13 General Abu Nuwar issued a statement that any new cabinet Hussein appointed must be approved by him and his staff. This was an obvious ploy to gain power, and it created public and military unrest, and rumors soon spread that Hussein was dead. Hussein traveled to Az Zarqa to meet with army troops to try to restore public order and confidence. The troops, angered at Nuwar's tactics, demanded his execution, but Hussein allowed him to leave the country. This incident, known as the Zarqa Affair, ultimately reinforced the army's loyalty to Hussein (28:95; 46:65).

Although Hussein had once again restored order, he still had serious problems with radical Arab nationalists who wanted to overthrow the monarchy. These nationalists were pro-Soviet so Hussein sought and received U.S. aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine. Jordan also formed an Arab Union with Iraq to offset

the alliance formed between its enemies Egypt and Syria. However, King Faisal and the Iraqi royal family were executed in a coup staged by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim. Qassim became dictator of Iraq and pulled his nation out of the Arab Union and the Baghdad pact (28:96). Also at this time the Syria-Jordan border was closed due to tension caused by a dispute over the Lebanese presidential election. Both of these events left Jordan isolated and open to attack.

The following year diplomatic relations were resumed with Egypt and Syria, and relations improved with Saudi Arabia. Events were relatively calm for the next two years until August 29, 1960 when Prime Minister Majali was assassinated. This assassination was traced to Syria, but Jordan did not invade Syria for fear of an Israeli attack if Jordan appeared vulnerable. Although troops were called to Amman and a curfew was imposed after the assassination, order was soon restored (45:32).

Jordan participated in an Arab conference in Cairo in 1964. This conference was significant because it was first to recognize the newly formed Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Ahmad Shukairy, a Jerusalem lawyer. The PLO's official objective was to liberate Palestine. However, this was to be done in conjunction with the Arab states and was not supposed to interfere with these nations or to claim jurisdiction over the West Bank. However, Shukairy soon changed these goals and began demanding more PLO independence (:2898).

The PLO and the Six Day War

The PLO came into direct conflict with the Jordanian government when they began to tax West Bank Palestinians and to give them arms. Events were complicated when Al Fatah was formed under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Both Al Fatah and the PLO began a series of raids on the Israeli border. Although these raids were funded by Syria, they were usually launched through Lebanon or Jordan. Hussein had been trying to end border disputes with Israel so he ended his government's recognition of the PLO, and Syria and the PLO responded with a massive anti-Hussein propaganda campaign (28:98).

In November 1966 Israel attacked the West Bank village of As Samu in response to a terrorist attack by the PLO. This caused massive demonstrations by Palestinians on the West Bank who perceived Hussein as taking too weak a stand against the Israelis, and Hussein once again had to rely on the army to restore public order (28:99). Tensions continued between the PLO and Hussein's government.

In May 1967 President Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran to Israel, and Israel declared this an act of war (37:57). Hussein went to Cairo and signed a military alliance with Egypt. The war which followed this incident left the Arab states badly defeated and, in their opinion, disgraced. It took Israel only a short time to launch a massive air attack which eliminated Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian ground forces. By the time of the cease fire on June 11 Israel had gained control of the West Bank and Jerusalem. This land is still claimed by

Israel even though UN Resolution 242, which guided settlement of the war, stated that no land gained could be legitimately kept (37:67).

The 1967 war was a massive blow to Jordan. Not only did Jordan lose the best one third of its agricultural land and the city of Jerusalem which has great Islamic significance, but Jordan also gained another 200,000 Palestinian refugees which it was not prepared to handle (37:192). Because the quick Arab defeat also disgraced the Palestinians, they became more supportive of the PLO and other Palestinian "freedom fighters".

In February 1969 Yassir Arafat assumed control of the PLO. Other Palestinian groups were formed, and the PLO was no longer the single representative of the Palestinian people. Hussein initially tried to help the guerrilla groups by providing training sites and economic aid. However, a struggle soon began between Hussein and the guerrillas for control of the Jordanian government, and it was not long before the rebel groups had become a state within a state. By the end of 1968 more guerrilla activity seemed to be focused on overthrowing Hussein than on fighting the Israelis. Several conflicts between the government and rebels were resolved to the benefit of the guerrilla forces, and it seemed that they had gained the upper hand. However, the government still received strong support from the army and the southern nomadic beduin shaykhs. In August 1970 fighting broke out between the army and guerrillas, and in September Hussein formed a military cabinet and ordered the suppression of the guerrillas. Three days later

the major rebel forces were defeated, and Syria then invaded northern Jordan to help the guerrillas. The Syrians were defeated, and civil order was restored (28:103).

Jordanian-Arab Relations

In September Hussein went to a summit meeting in Cairo which was called by Nasser to try to restore Arab peace. At this summit Hussein and Arafat were persuaded to enter a new agreement which would recognize the rights of guerrilla movements and the Jordanian government. In spite of this agreement Hussein's soldiers continued to disarm the guerrillas and to arrest those who did not comply with their orders (28:104). In June 1971 members of seven Palestinian groups called for the overthrow of Hussein, and the following month the Jordanian army eliminated the last rebel bases.

Within a week of their defeat most captured Palestinians were released. However, this did not stop protests by other Arab nations due to Jordan's use of force against the Palestinians. Iraq and Syria closed their borders to Jordan, while other Arab nations launched strong verbal attacks against Hussein (28:105). Saudi Arabia arranged meetings between Jordanian and Palestinian officials in an attempt to restore peace. However, no agreements were reached, and in September the more radical Palestinian groups began to retaliate against Jordan. Three unsuccessful airline hijacking attempts were made, and on the 28th Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal was assassinated by the Black September Organization, a secret Palestinian terrorist

group so named because of the Palestinians killed by Hussein's forces in September 1970 (4:35; 61:33).

In March 1972 Hussein announced plans for a United Arab Kingdom which would contain both a Jordanian and Palestinian region. Each region would be largely autonomous, but Hussein would have power in both. Although this plan was designed to help heal relations between Jordan and the Palestinians it had the opposite effect. Most Arab nations perceived this plan as a sign of Jordan's willingness to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, an accusation which King Hussein strongly denied.

In September 1973 Hussein attended a summit with Presidents Sadat and Assad in a successful attempt to renew diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria (28:105). Jordan's relations with other Arab nations were further improved when Hussein pardoned all political prisoners. During the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 Jordan sent troops to aid Syria in the Golan Heights, but Jordan did not open a third front against Israel as it had in 1967. Overall, Jordan was not heavily involved in this conflict (4:36; 28:106).

Through most of 1974 Hussein continued to regard the West Bank as a legitimate part of Jordan in spite of strong pressure from other Arab countries and the PLO. In September Egypt, Syria, and the PLO met and declared the PLO as the "only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" (73:30). After this declaration Jordan refused to participate in further Mid East peace talks.

In October 1974 representatives from twenty Arab states

met at the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat. This conference unanimously recognized the PLO as the legitimate Palestinian representative, and more importantly it authorized the PLO to govern any Palestinian territory recaptured from the Israelis. Hussein's economic dependence on other Arab states forced him to concur with the conclusions of the Rabat Conference. This ended Jordan's right to represent the Palestinians, and it eliminated any hope that Jordan would eventually regain the West Bank. Although the Rabat Conference resulted in significant losses for Jordan it did improve Jordan's relations with its Arab neighbors. For the time being, Jordan was no longer at odds with other Arabs over ownership of the West Bank or Palestinian representation (28:106).

Jordan's relations with its Arab neighbors were again strained in 1977 when President Sadat visited Israel. Sadat's visit was condemned by Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other Arab states. Jordan, however, did not openly criticize Sadat's actions, and Hussein played a conciliatory role in trying to improve relations between Egypt and other Arab states.

Although Hussein did not condemn Sadat's actions, he was totally opposed to Israel's proposal for peace. This plus the fact that Jordan could not afford to be isolated from the other Arab states explains why Hussein would not participate in the Camp David Peace Talks with Egypt and Israel. In fact, Jordan attended the Baghdad Arab summit where a list of sanctions were adopted against Egypt. After the peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel, Jordan was one of the first remaining Arab

nations to break diplomatic relations with Egypt (26:25).

Several months after the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty was signed relations improved between Jordan and Egypt. At the same time Jordan's relations with Syria worsened, largely because of Syrian allegations that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was conducting terrorist activities in Syria. Syria supports Iran in the Iran-Iraqi war, and relations between Syria and Jordan were further damaged by Jordan's aid to Iraq in this conflict (73:30).

Summary

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was officially recognized as an independent nation by the Treaty of London in 1946. Since that time, Jordan has experienced numerous conflicts with Israel, including the Six Day War which resulted in the loss of the West Bank. Jordan's independent policy towards Israel and the PLO have frequently isolated Jordan from its Arab neighbors. Jordan was widely condemned by the Arab world in 1950 when Jordan annexed the West Bank and granted full citizenship rights to Palestinian refugees. These actions were seen as an acceptance of the status quo while other Arab nations wanted to defeat Israel and regain the Palestinian homeland. Jordan was again condemned by its Arab neighbors when King Hussein drove the PLO out of Jordan in 1970. Thus, Jordan knows what it's like to be isolated from other Arab states and vulnerable to attack from Israel. It is for this reason that Jordan is reluctant to enter peace negotiations with Israel.

IV. Jordanian Vulnerabilities

Introduction

Jordan is a country beset by many weaknesses. Financially dependent on foreign aid since its formation, Jordan faced serious problems this past year when half the aid promised by its Arab neighbors was never received, almost causing Jordan to default on their Foreign Military Sales loans with the United States.

Jordan's tenuous financial state has led to a weak military which is qualitatively and quantitatively outmatched by its enemies, presently Israel and Syria. Jordan wants to buy more weapons from the United States. However, strong pressure in Congress from pro-Israeli groups has so far blocked most major weapon sales. Unless the United States changes its present policy and sells first line weapons to Jordan, it is unlikely that King Hussein will be persuaded to enter peace talks with Israel. It is important that the United States understand how vulnerable Jordan is and why U.S. aid and weapons are needed.

Jordanian Perception of Mid-East Threats

Jordan sees itself as vulnerable, completely surrounded by enemies. Jordanians believe the greatest threat to their stability is Israel. El Hassan Bin Talal, the Crown Prince of Jordan, has stated:

After the 1967 War, other Arab governments

learned--and what a costly lesson--what we had known for almost two decades: Israel was to be an enduring reality of the Middle East, and the issue was not to undo the 1947 injustice to Palestinians and all Arabs but rather to constrain an Israel hungry for territorial expansion and powerful enough to obtain it (62:807).

Jordan's military forces are greatly outnumbered by Israeli forces, and many Jordanian officials are convinced that Israel will not permit a change in the status quo. Some Jordanians even believe that Israel would deliberately create a new Middle Eastern military crisis if the U.S. threatened to reduce military and financial aid, forcing continued U.S. aid to Israel and ensuring Israeli military superiority.

Syria is perceived as the next greatest threat to Jordan's stability. Since 1974, high level meetings have been held periodically between the Arab nations to discuss mutual problems. After the Rabat summit meeting of 1974 Jordan tried to strengthen its position in the Middle East by forming a loose alliance with Syria. In fact, in the fall of 1976 Jordan was the only Arab nation to support Syrian actions against the PLO in Lebanon (26:24). However, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent Baghdad summit, Jordan's relations with Syria worsened, and since 1980 tension between the two nations has threatened to erupt into violence. For example, Syria accused Jordan of financing Muslim Brotherhood attacks against Syria and granting the Brotherhood refuge in Jordan. In addition, Jordanian support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraqi war caused tension between Syria and Jordan (73:30; 57:40). Because Syrian military forces greatly outnumber Jordanian forces, Jordanian

officials fear Syrian aggression if their forces are ever freed from action in Lebanon.

The Gulf War between Iran and Iraq is also a threat to Jordan's stability. At the start of this war in September 1980 most Arab government officials optimistically believed that Iraq would quickly defeat Khomeini's Iranian forces. Therefore, Jordan was quick to pledge and provide its support to Iraq. For example, Jordan's Prince Hassan Air Base has been providing protection to Iraq's fighters so they can avoid Iranian attack. Jordan has also been providing war material and a limited number of volunteer soldiers. Jordan believed that Iraq would be successful and that Jordan would regain a valuable financial supporter by backing them in the war (26:39). Iraq's victory would have eliminated any large scale fundamentalist movement in the Gulf area which would have added further to Jordan's stability.

If Iraq loses the war with Iran, which now seems probable, Jordan will be faced with serious problems. Not only will they lose Iraq's financial backing, they will also face a hostile, aggressive Iran which has pledged its resources to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Jordan will face internal threats as well. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic fundamentalist group which is legal in Jordan, would undoubtedly take Iran's victory as a signal for action. Hussein presently has some control over the Muslim Brotherhood, but an Iranian victory would probably cause him to lose all control of this organization (26:39).

Jordan's Military Status

Jordan is militarily outnumbered by Israel as well as by most of its Arab neighbors. Jordan's military weakness developed during the mid to late 1970s when Jordan invested in its economy rather than its military establishment. During the same period its neighbors started a massive military buildup. Although Jordan's forces are well trained, highly organized, and very well disciplined, their lack of personnel and equipment makes their current defense problematic (51:56).

A prime example of Jordan's military inadequacy is the Jordanian Royal Air Force (JRAF). Vastly outnumbered by both Syria and Israel, the JRAF has 23 Mirage Fls, and 188 F-5s of various configurations. Syria has 87 MiG-17s, 330 MiG-21s, 140 MiG-23s, 25 MiG-25s, and 65 Sukhoi Su-7/20/22. Israel's Air Force includes 131 F-4s, 39 F-15s, 71 F-16s, 174 A-4s, and 178 Kfirs (51:55). This not only gives Syria and Israel a sixfold numerical advantage over Jordan, it also gives them a tremendous qualitative advantage. Jordan's army faces a similar situation.

Jordan's military forces are also severely outnumbered in personnel. The JRAF has 7,500 people, and total Jordanian military personnel number only 71,000. Syria, on the other hand, has 200,000 men under arms, and Israel has 180,000 (51:57). This lack of both modern weapon systems and military personnel places Jordan in a weak bargaining position.

To solve some of these problems, Jordan wants to buy a number of weapons from the United States. Top priority

purchases are for air defense interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and air defense guns and radar (53:42). Jordan bought two Westinghouse TPS-43 radars in March 1983, and five TPS-63s in May, greatly improving their air defense capabilities. Jordanian officials are also investigating different computerized command and control systems. In addition, Lt. Gen. Al-Sharif Zeid Bin Shaker, Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, stresses Jordan's need for 26 Hawk assault firing platoons, an air defense missile system, and a system like the U.S. Army's division air defense gun (DIVAD). He would also like to replace the nation's outdated M48 tanks and has already purchased the British Khalid tank (53:46).

Finally, Jordan must rebuild its Air Force. Officials estimate that Jordan needs to add at least 72 first-line aircraft to its forces if it is to have a credible deterrence. The planes they are most interested in are the Northrop F-20 and General Dynamics F-16C. They want the F-16C because it has an avionics system and a weapon system capable of hitting a target beyond visual range. The F-16 is also noted for endurance which the Jordanians need for combat air patrol. The F-20, on the other hand, is known for its quick reaction time and would be used in case of attack. Like the Israelis, Jordan has repeatedly stressed that it wishes only to build up its defensive forces (52:59).

Jordan's Financial Status

The situation is greatly complicated by Jordan's recent

financial difficulties which have created serious problems for Jordan in meeting payments on FMS loans and on loans from other countries. To help them avoid default in 1982, the U.S. government authorized the application of \$56.9 million from 1983 FMS credits and other unobligated funds to cover Jordan's current payments (53:39).

Most of Jordan's current financial problem is due to the failure of other Arab nations to provide their share of the \$1.25 billion a year promised to Jordan at the Baghdad Summit in 1978. This aid was to be provided on the condition that Jordan would not enter any unilateral agreement with Israel regarding the West Bank or other Palestinian issues (53:41). Although Jordan has held up its end of the agreement, many of its Arab neighbors have not. Kuwait and Libya both cut back their shares, and in 1980 Algeria defaulted. Iraq has not made a payment for the past two years, primarily because of its war with Iran. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates generally meet their payments. However, even they are usually late, making it difficult for Jordan to meet its financial obligations to other countries. In sum, Jordan has received less than half of the promised funds from countries attending the Baghdad Summit (53:41).

Another major source of revenue for Jordan has traditionally been the money sent home by Jordanians working in other Arab countries. Jordan has received as much as \$1.5 billion a year from these workers. Unfortunately, over the past

year this amount decreased by 40% due to the worldwide cutback in oil production, placing further strain on the Jordanian economy (53:42).

To compound Jordan's financial problems, over the past five to six years they have been moving from Grant Aid to Foreign Military Sales when obtaining weapons from the United States. Technically, equipment sent to a country under Grant Aid still belongs to the United States and is subject to recall at the discretion of the U.S. Under FMS, however, title to the equipment passes to the purchasing nation before it is shipped from the United States. This makes FMS politically more attractive to Jordan, but it is much more expensive than Grant Aid (34). Thus, moving to FMS has placed additional financial stress on Jordan at a time when its revenues have been sharply reduced.

Jordan's entire FMS program with the U.S. totals \$1.2 billion. Jordan is the United State's twelfth largest FMS client, but Jordan's FMS package is only 8.8 percent as large as Egypt's and only 6.7 percent as large as Israel's (53:41). President Reagan's proposed increase in Jordan's Grant Aid has met with strong opposition in Congress. Any time changes are proposed in current FMS programs, questions are raised in Congress about the affect these changes will have on the strategic balance of a region. Many Arab officials have claimed that the Israeli lobby prevents the U.S. from increasing FMS to any Arab nation.

Jordan's Foreign Policy Goals

Jordan's foreign policy centers around the three main goals of King Hussein: the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the maintenance of ties with Arab neighbors, and the protection of the Hashemite dynasty as the rulers of Jordan. These goals are extremely complex and interrelated. Dozens of proposals have been made to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but none of them have been acceptable to all sides involved. Nevertheless, one thing is generally agreed upon: Jordan is central to the resolution of this conflict due to its location and population, 60% of which is Palestinian (56:27). Despite its centrality, Jordan must move cautiously to avoid alienating its Arab neighbors, for King Hussein would undoubtedly place his throne in jeopardy if he wavers in support of Palestinian goals.

The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a difficult issue for Jordan. In its "Federation Scheme" of 1972 Jordan advocated Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This new territory would be called Palestine and would be federated with Jordan in a United Arab Kingdom (UAK). Although both regions of the UAK would elect representatives to parliament and other government posts, the ultimate authority would be the monarch who would control the army and preside over parliament. This plan would have returned the occupied territories to the Palestinians without undermining King Hussein's position. Predictably, it was condemned by the PLO and other Palestinian groups because it did not grant full autonomy to the Palestinians (48:18).

A great deal has changed since Jordan proposed its Federation Scheme, which today is seen as having little chance of success. When the plan was proposed, King Hussein had hoped to negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. However, the Arab Summit of 1974 gave this right to the PLO, and the PLO has traditionally rejected any plans which would place the Palestinians under Jordanian control. Today, however, the PLO is fragmented and weakened by internal conflict and military defeat. How much they might be willing to compromise on this issue remains to be seen (38:48).

Israeli actions also indicate that the Federation Scheme has little chance of success. Israel has been rapidly building apartments and homes on the West Bank; last year alone over 65,000 Israeli families moved to the West Bank. It is increasingly less likely that Israel will return this territory.

The protection of the Hashemite dynasty is obviously closely linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If King Hussein agreed to enter peace negotiations with Israel without the backing of the PLO and other Arab nations, he would invite assassination by radical Palestinians and Islamic fundamentalists. Even a resolution of this conflict could weaken Hussein's control of his kingdom. The formation of an independent Palestinian state would undoubtedly undermine Hussein's control of the Palestinians within Jordan, and it could threaten the existence of Jordan as an independent nation. Jordan has long been viewed by many Palestinians as "part of mandatory Palestine" (48:17).

Jordan's goal of maintaining close ties to its Arab neighbors is also complicated by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan has been dependent on outside aid since its formation, and today it depends heavily on its Arab neighbors for this aid. The Baghdad summit demonstrated the control which this gives other nations over Jordan's foreign policy when Jordan was prevented from taking any independent action with regard to Israel. In turn, Jordan was promised economic aid. It is thus unlikely that King Hussein will make any move towards peace with Israel unless he has the tacit approval of his Arab neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia.

U.S.-Jordanian Relations

Because of its geopolitical position, the United States is interested in strengthening its ties with Jordan. King Hussein has long been considered a moderate pro-Western ruler, and his nation is crucial to the success of President Reagan's Mid East peace plan, announced 1 September 1982 after the PLO was forced to evacuate West Beirut. Reagan stated:

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza. So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel. There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-

government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace (50:33).

Jordanian officials see many aspects of Reagan's peace initiative as positive, particularly the plan for the self government of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in association with Jordan. The similarity with Hussein's Federation Plan is striking (73:29).

However, at this point Jordan's military is in too weak a position to even consider taking such a controversial lead in the Mid East peace process. It is unlikely that King Hussein will be willing to take such a dangerous step unless he is able to obtain sophisticated, first-line weapon systems. U.S. officials have estimated that it would require \$6-10 billion to advance Jordanian military forces enough to deter threats from its Arab neighbors if Jordan decided to enter the peace negotiations. Much of this aid would have to come from the United States. Reagan administration officials estimate that \$400-700 million a year in FMS credits and economic aid will be required over a period of 10 years. To date, the United States seems unwilling to grant this amount of aid to Jordan. In fiscal year 1982 Jordan received only \$54.9 million in FMS loan guarantees. In fiscal year 1983 the Reagan administration asked for \$75 million in loan guarantees for Jordan, but under a continuing resolution Jordan received only \$40 million (53:41). It will obviously take a greater commitment on the part of the U.S. to persuade Jordan to join the peace negotiations.

Islamic Fundamentalism and Jordan

Another factor in this already complex equation is the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalist. The powerful movement has had a significant effect on Jordan's foreign policy, particularly towards Israel. Even before the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, Jordan has been isolated and vulnerable when it took independent action regarding Israel. For example, Jordan was denounced by other Arab nations when it granted full citizenship rights to Palestinian refugees. This was seen as an acceptance of the status quo, and Jordan's neighbors wanted to continue the conflict with Israel until it had been resolved to the benefit of the Palestinians.

With the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in many Arab nations, Jordan must be even more cautious in formulating foreign policy. The assassination of Anwar Sadat and the recent terrorist bombings of embassies in Lebanon and Kuwait have been linked to fundamentalist groups. King Hussein has been the object of 17 assassination attempts in the 30 years he has ruled, and he is well aware of the dangers these groups present (73:30).

The most destabilizing fundamentalist resurgence in recent times occurred in Iran when the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini assumed religious and political control of his country. Iran has had a very destabilizing effect on the region because of its announced intention of spreading its form of fundamentalism by any and all means, including terrorism and

assassination. This is seen as a definite threat by Iran's Arab neighbors. Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan has stated: "We see a threat to the whole area from the exporting of the Iranian revolution. We feel this movement must be contained." (63:51).

Iran's war with Iraq has also had a destabilizing effect on the entire region, causing hostility among nations not directly involved in the conflict. If Iran successfully defeats and invades Iraq it is likely that Egypt and Jordan would intervene in Iraq's defense, which would in turn bring Algeria, Syria, and Libya directly into the war (63:52).

The fundamentalist resurgence in Iran has also complicated any peace negotiations with Israel. Iran has pledged its resources to the support of its Muslim brothers and the destruction of Israel. On May 27, 1982 the Ayatollah warned Arab countries that they would:

'earn the wrath of the Iranian nation and its powerful armed forces' if they ever accepted the Camp David accords. 'If they do not return to the fold of Islam today, tomorrow will be too late' (63:51).

The Islamic fundamentalist movement poses a definite threat to Jordan. First, King Hussein is in personal danger of assassination by Islamic fundamentalists attracted to the teachings of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Fundamentalist groups view Hussein as too moderate, pro-Western, and conciliatory to Israel. Any move which Hussein makes that reinforces this view only increases the threat to his life. If King Hussein were eliminated, he would be succeeded by his brother, Crown Prince Hassan. Hassan has been active in his brother's government and

is considered an expert on the West Bank. However, whether the strong support given to King Hussein by the army and the beduins would also be given to his brother is questionable.

Secondly, Jordan faces a direct threat from Iran's fundamentalists. Unless events change drastically, Iran will undoubtedly win its war with Iraq. If this happens Iranian troops will be free to spread their influence to other countries. One Iranian official was quoted as saying:

'It will take one year to bring down the government of Iraq and then maybe two years for an Islamic government to establish control in that country . . . Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will follow . . . there are large Iranian Shiite communities in those countries' (32).

Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have a great deal of money, but small populations have prevented the establishment of a significant defense. Officials in these countries have stated that they could not defend themselves against Iran without outside aid (65). If these countries are defeated, it would leave Saudi Arabia and Jordan open and vulnerable.

However, at this time the greatest threat to Jordan from Iran's fundamentalists is probably internal. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are already experiencing problems from Shi'ite fundamentalists in their countries who are attracted to Khomeini's radical ideas. As Iran becomes more successful in the war with Iraq, the appeal of Khomeini's ideas will grow. The Ayatollah has done much to restore Muslim pride and strength. He threw the most powerful Western nation out of Iran, built up his nation's defense, and restored the Iranian

economy (32). His success has already been taken as a positive sign by fundamentalists in other countries, and Jordan provides the perfect environment for these ideas to grow. Refugee camps in Jordan have always been a breeding ground for discontent , and camp conditions could heighten fundamentalist appeal. These groups would definitely threaten the existence of the current Jordanian government, although for now the army's support of King Hussein would probably protect him from any immediate threat. However, if Hussein tried to repress a resurgence movement by using force, he would probably face even more danger by alienating himself from large segments of Jordan's population and by isolating Jordan from its Arab neighbors.

Muslim fundamentalism will always be a threat to Jordan, even if Jordan remains free of a direct fundamentalist assault. The fact that fundamentalists are a constant threat affects Jordan's foreign policy, making King Hussein far more reluctant to negotiate with Israel. Any step Hussein makes contrary to Muslim doctrine places him in personal danger, a fact of which he is well aware.

The effect of an Islamic resurgence on U.S. aid to Jordan would depend on the origin and general support of the resurgence. If it was an internal movement with wide spread support, Jordan would choose to break its ties with the United States as Iran did in 1980. This would mean the termination of all foreign military sales contracts with the United States. If, on the other hand, Jordan faced the imposition of Islamic fundamentalism by external forces, U.S. aid to Jordan would

probably increase in an attempt to protect Jordan's sovereignty and to retain Jordan as a friend and ally of the United States. However, the United States needs to realize that the threat to Jordan is immediate. If King Hussein is seen as weak, politically or militarily, the entire Hashemite dynasty will be in danger.

Summary

Jordan is a vulnerable country, faced with numerous economic, military, and political problems. This past year Jordan received less than half the money promised by its Arab neighbors. This created problems for Jordan in meeting weapons payments to the U.S. and other countries which in turn weakened Jordan's efforts to build up its military. The United States would like to strengthen its ties with Jordan and to persuade Jordan to begin peace talks with Israel. However, Jordan faces threats from many sources which presently prevent it from negotiating with Israel. The greatest of these threats is posed by Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East.

V. Key Mid-East Players

Introduction

The Middle East is one of the world's most politically complex areas because of its frequently conflicting ethnic, national, religious, and regional groups. Moreover, the United States' national commitment to Israel causes U.S. directed hostility among the Arab nations on whom the U.S. depends for much of its imported oil. Most Arab countries advocate an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel, on the other hand, wants to protect its sovereignty by surrounding itself with as many buffer zones like the West Bank as possible. Initially, the PLO wanted to destroy Israel, but now seems willing to accept Israeli sovereignty as long as they get part of their homeland back.

To further complicate matters, Iran wants to spread its brand of Islamic fundamentalism, and the Soviet Union is always willing to take advantage of any instability to strengthen its influence in the region. Muslim fundamentalism is one of the most destabilizing elements in the area. Regional fundamentalists strongly oppose Israeli existence and are a direct threat to any nation which proposes peace with Israel. There is little doubt that Sadat was assassinated because he initiated a peace settlement with Israel. The message his assassination sent to moderate regimes like Jordan is clear. Obviously, if the United States is to have a comprehensive,

realistic Mid-East policy, U..S. policy makers must understand the different groups in the region, their goals, and how these goals conflict.

History of U.S. Mid-East Policy

Before World War II the United States lacked a well defined foreign policy in the Middle East. Following the Revolutionary War, Presidents Washington and Jefferson warned that the U.S. and Europe had different interests and goals and that it would be best for the U.S. to keep its policies separate from those in Europe. Before long this early caution evolved into a strong commitment to avoid foreign entanglements, a commitment that led to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, warning Europe that the U.S. would tolerate no further colonization in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine was not challenged for over a century, largely because the U.S. was still protected by the British empire (13:47). British protection and the fact that it was geographically isolated allowed the U.S. to continue its isolationist policy until World War II. During this period Americans concentrated on internal affairs and did not establish strong diplomatic ties with any nation, including those in the Middle East.

World War II was a severe blow to Britain's economy and morale, causing Britain to lose its national will to continue as world leader and maintainer of peace. This forced the U.S. to give up its isolationist policy and to take a more active role in world affairs. In 1945 this change in philosophy became

official when the U.S. joined the United Nations (13:46). In spite of this policy change, the U.S. still lacked diplomatic ties with the Middle East because after WWI most Mid-East nations became colonies of Britain or France. Under international law the United States could not establish diplomatic ties with these colonies, but instead had to work through the controlling European nation (13:399). Therefore, the U.S. failed to deal directly with the Middle East until well after World War II. At that time the United States was forced to establish a foreign policy in an extremely volatile area about which it had virtually no direct knowledge. Lack of experience in the area still hinders U.S. Mid-East policy.

Unfortunately, the main contact between the United States and the Middle East before World War II involved either religious organizations or economic exploitators. Churches often sent missionaries to the area to convert the "heathen." The U.S. government had little control over these missionaries, who were thus free to meddle in regional politics. In Sudan, for example, missionaries were successful in persuading the government to hire only English-speaking employees. Since these missionaries operated the only schools which taught English, they had a monopoly on educating future government employees (43:118). U.S. missionaries frequently clashed with Muslim religious leaders, creating tension and long-lasting ill will towards the United States.

U.S. businesses were also prominent in the Middle East prior to World War II. Companies became established in the Mid

East to exploit the region's vast oil reserves and were naturally interested in influencing any regional political decisions which might affect their operations. ARAMCO in particular exercised significant political power in Saudi Arabia but made decisions with no regard to their affect on U.S. foreign policy (13:403).

During World War II the United States and Western Europe began to realize the strategic importance of the Middle East. Successful campaigns in North Africa and Allied control of Iran and the Persian Gulf region were instrumental in securing the Allied victory. Control of North Africa and the Persian Gulf secured access to vital shipping routes and oil (13:401).

Although the United States was beginning to realize the strategic importance of the Middle East, Zionist groups within the U.S. were the actual catalyst for U.S. political involvement in the Mid-East. The Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine received government support in the U.S. as early as WWI. In fact, President Woodrow Wilson supported Zionist goals, and during his administration Congress passed a number of resolutions supporting these goals. President Franklin D. Roosevelt also supported Zionist objectives in spite of his promise at the end of WWII that no action would be taken by the Allies regarding Palestine that would adversely affect Arab interests (13:401).

By the late 1930s U.S. support was strong enough for the world Zionist organization to shift its base of operations from Britain to the United States. After WWII U.S. Zionist groups

launched a large-scale, highly successful media campaign to gain public support which led to American pressure in the United Nations for the division of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Since Israel's creation in 1948, the U.S. has continued as its closest ally and strongest financial supporter (13:401).

Doubtlessly, the U.S. position of unwavering support of Israel has complicated U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, forcing them to attempt mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Recently, however, U.S. officials have repeatedly criticized Israel for engaging in massive retaliations, for annexing Jerusalem, and for encouraging Jewish settlement of the West Bank. At the same time, the U.S. has criticized terrorist acts by the PLO and other Palestinian groups. While U.S. officials believe they've been fair in their role as peacemakers, many Arabs believe differently and see the U.S. Mid-East role as a contradiction. The United States supplies Israel with massive amounts of military and financial aid, support which gives Israel strength to continue building settlements on the West Bank, to refuse to give up territorial gains, and to take aggressive actions against its Arab neighbors. The U.S. continues to supply military support to Israel in spite of what Arabs see as blatant acts of aggression by Israel which violate U.S.-Israeli arms agreements prohibiting the use of U.S. weapons for all but defensive purposes. The Jordanian Times pointed out the apparent contradiction in U.S. policy in an editorial on 10 February

1982:

'The United States has lost its credibility in the Arab world because the only consistent thing it does well is to have given Israel total financial, military, and political support. It cannot do this for long without completely losing touch with the Arabs, and this is precisely what is happening right now' (48:5).

The U.S. argues that Israel needs U.S. aid to survive. However, Arab nations reply that Israel's military already outnumbers its neighbors and further buildups only encourage Israeli aggression.

The U.S. stepped up its role as peacemaker in the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, spent extensive time in the region meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders. Kissinger's efforts led to a formal agreement in 1975 between Egypt and Israel in which Israel agreed to give up control over the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and to return the Abu Rudeis oil fields to Egypt. Egypt in turn opened the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and pledged not to use armed force in resolving further differences with Israel. The U.S. tacitly agreed to supply aid to Egypt if Egypt maintained the cease fire (13:415). Sadat was widely criticized by other Arab leaders for negotiating with Israel, signing a formal agreement, and promising not to use armed force in solving remaining issues with Israel.

In spite of their agreement, serious differences still existed between Israel and Egypt. A consensus could not be reached on the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the refugee problem, and the status of territory Israel captured

in the Six Day War in 1967. Egyptian President Sadat wanted peace for his nation, and in November 1977 stated his willingness to go to the Israeli parliament itself to obtain this peace (44:170). Sadat's announcement was followed by an invitation by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin for Sadat to address the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Four days later Sadat became the first Arab leader ever to visit Israel. This move had incredible significance because it broke down psychological barriers which inhibited negotiations between the two sides, and, more importantly, was the first time that an Arab nation officially and publicly recognized Israel's right to exist (Nyrop:171).

Sadat's historic trip was followed by Prime Minister Begin's attendance at a summit in Ismailia, Egypt, in December 1977. While at this summit Begin announced opposition to the Israeli withdrawal from any territory gained in the 1967 war. Begin stated that the Israeli retention of these territories was legitimate because the Six Day War was a defensive action for Israel, and Israel was thus not obligated to give up any gains made as a result of this war. Begin also refused to recognize 'the murderers' organization calling itself the PLO' and to consider the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Israeli occupied territory (44:171). Begin did, however, agree to Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, a conciliatory move definitely aimed at Egypt.

Begin's plan for peace was condemned by Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, threatening to destroy the fragile

beginnings of Sadat's peace initiative. Sadat called Begin the 'only obstacle to peace', and tensions increased between Egypt and Israel. In the summer of 1978 Saudi Arabia announced that Sadat's peace efforts had failed and it was time for the Arab world to reunite against Israel. This prompted U.S. President Carter to invite President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to a special summit at Camp David on 5 September which both leaders accepted (64:25).

The Camp David Summit lasted thirteen days and resulted in two "frameworks" for peace, one outlining a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the other establishing a basis for self government for the West Bank and Gaza. Optimism was at a peak after the Camp David Summit, but high hopes were soon dashed after both sides began to argue over the fine points of their agreement. Sadat and Begin argued about the link between the two "frameworks" or issues discussed at Camp David. President Carter wanted to keep these issues separate so the success of one would not depend on the other. However, Sadat saw the issues as closely linked and was afraid that treating them independently would make it appear that he was forming a separate treaty with Israel. Neither side seemed willing to budge. In a last ditch effort to reach a compromise, President Carter went to the Middle East to talk to Sadat and Begin. Carter promised generous increases in U.S. economic and military aid to both sides once a treaty was signed. A compromise proposal which included Israeli access to Sinai oil was finally accepted, and on 26 March 1979 Sadat and Begin formally signed a

Treaty of Peace (64:31).

The U.S. viewed the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty as a tremendous diplomatic achievement and a significant step towards achieving peace in the Middle East. However, other Arab nations saw this settlement as treason by Sadat, and it further alienated them from the United States. This treaty eliminated Egypt as a threat to Israel and removed them from the Arab alliance. Egypt had the strongest military force of the Arab nations, and by eliminating them as a threat Israel freed forces from the Egyptian border which could then be used elsewhere. Other Arab nations were thus faced with a greater threat from Israel as well as the loss of their strongest ally. Recently, Egypt rejoined the Arab League. The consequence of this move is not yet known.

Those nations which rejected the Israeli-Egyptian settlement had other motives as well. Some, such as Syria and Iraq, have been internally divided for years and have used the mutual hatred of Israel to unite their countries. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other pro-Western nations rejected the peace settlement because of genuine concern over Israel's actions in annexing Jerusalem and the continuing problem of the Palestinian refugees (35:1055; 13:417).

Oil and U.S. Mid-East Policy

Since the Six Day War, oil has frequently been used to coerce Western powers to decrease aid to Israel and try to gain Israeli concessions concerning Jerusalem and the West Bank. The

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on the U.S. and Europe during the 1967 War, forcing the U.S. to supply oil to its European allies from its own reserves. OPEC used the same tactic in 1973, although this time the embargo was longer, more complete, and with more far reaching consequences. The 1973 embargo was started by Saudi Arabia in response to a request by President Nixon to Congress for \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel which was involved in the Yom Kippur War against the Arab states. After Saudi Arabia announced its embargo, other Gulf states followed suit. This embargo lasted until 18 March 1974 by which time it had exerted a devastating effect on the economies of the U.S. and Western Europe. Although the U.S. government condemned the embargo and stated that it would not be coerced into withdrawing support for Israel, it is clear this embargo strongly influenced U.S. Mid East policy and made Americans more receptive to the Arab perspective of the Palestinian issue. The U.S. was no longer willing to support Israel unconditionally (64:75).

The amount of influence which OPEC will have in the future is questionable. By the early 1980s OPEC ran into problems which significantly reduced its influence. By this time Western countries had reduced their oil consumption while a number of non-OPEC nations had increased oil output. OPEC's unity decreased as members argued over what course of action they should take to counter decreased demand for their oil. The current oil glut is undoubtedly temporary; however, there is

uncertainty about OPEC's ability to resolve its current differences and once again present a united front. In 1973 OPEC was able to overcome its internal conflicts (13:421). Unless it is able to do so again, OPEC's influence on U.S. foreign policy will probably decrease.

Current U.S. Mid-East Policy

During the early months of his administration President Ronald Reagan was repeatedly criticized by Arab countries and the U.S. press for his "oversimplified" view of the Mid-East conflict, a view which stressed the strong and immediate Soviet threat while treating the Arab-Israeli conflict and other internal disputes as relatively minor. Reagan divided the region's nations into pro-Soviet or pro-American groups and failed to recognize the complex relations between these countries. When U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Israel in 1981 he made such strong statements against Syria that Prime Minister Begin took it as a sign that the U.S. would not mind if Israel "rearranged" its military forces in Lebanon. When hostility between Israel and Syria increased and the crisis in Lebanon grew, President Reagan realized that more emphasis had to be placed on regional conflict (7:2).

On 1 September 1982 President Reagan announced a new peace initiative for the Middle East which was designed to address major regional disputes. This initiative has seven main points:

1. The Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through

negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace'.

2. The United States is committed to Israel's security and will oppose any plan which threatens Israeli sovereignty.

3. 'The United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel'.

4. A period of time must be provided for the peaceful transfer of authority "from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza".

5. The United States will not support additional Israeli settlement of the West Bank and Gaza.

6. 'Self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace'.

7. Jerusalem's status should be decided through negotiation but must remain undivided (16:59).

This initiative was based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories captured in the 1967 War and the acceptance of the existence and political independence of all states in the area (67:88) (See Appendix).

During the past several months President Reagan has accelerated the U.S.'s peacemaking role in the Middle East. He met personally with King Hussein in December 1982 to explain his Mid East peace initiative and to gain Hussein's support for the plan (17:71). As Ambassador Nicholas Veliotis, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated recently, the immediate goal of the U.S. "is the resumption of negotiations which will include a Jordanian delegation, hopefully with representative Palestinian participation" (68:57).

In April 1983 King Hussein and Yassir Arafat met to discuss Reagan's initiative and came to an agreement on Hussein's entry in the peace process. However, radical members of the PLO forced some amendments into Hussein and Arafat's agreement which were unacceptable to Hussein, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. (15:48). After the PLO was forced out of Jordan in 1970, the PLO moved its headquarters to Lebanon where recent events fragmented PLO unity, forcing Arafat and his supporters to leave the country. Arafat is scheduled to meet with King Hussein soon to discuss once again the role which Jordan will play in negotiations with Israel.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 has further complicated the U.S.'s role in the Middle East. Israel claimed the invasion was a defensive move to destroy Palestinian artillery and missile sites in a 40 kilometer zone inside Lebanon. However, Israel soon extended the invasion and placed 120,000 soldiers in Lebanon. On 16, 17, and 18 September 1982 Israeli soldiers were accused by the PLO and Arab countries of allowing the slaughter of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Death tolls at these camps ranged from several hundred according to the Western press and Lebanese officials to over 4,000 reported by Palestinian leaders (31:9). The discrepancy in these reports show the difficulty in obtaining accurate accounts of Mid East events. The Sabra and Shatila massacres plus the extended invasion turned world opinion against Israel and forced the U.S. to reevaluate its regional foreign policy. Charles Shultz, U.S. Secretary of

State, convinced President Reagan to tone down U.S. support of Israel as public opinion against alleged Israeli atrocities rose (Hudson:8). The U.S. was further embarrassed when Israel invaded West Beirut after Bashir Gemayel, Lebanese President-elect, was assassinated. This move violated U.S.-Israeli agreements obtained by U.S. envoy Philip Habib during negotiations to get the PLO to evacuate Beirut (31:9).

The Arab Perception

Many Arabs believe that they have been lied to and unjustly treated by the Western powers. After WWII Arabs were repeatedly promised by Britain and the U.S. that no action would be taken regarding Palestine that would "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" (8:3). In June 1922 Winston Churchill published his First White Paper on Palestine which stated:

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is England.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab delegation, the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine . . . it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community (8:4).

Despite these and other promises, Jewish immigration to Palestine accelerated, and in 1948 Israel was formed.

Many Arabs believe Israel has little regard for international law. According to Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention an "occupying power must observe the laws in force in the occupied territory at the time of occupation" (8:6). Article 47 thus prohibits Israel from imposing its own legal system and laws on Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel violated this Article by imposing its legal system in the West Bank and Gaza. Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter prohibits the use of force except for self defense. Israel violated this article when it invaded Lebanon and perhaps also when it bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Israel claimed that Iraq was using this reactor as a cover to develop its own nuclear weapons, and the destruction of this reactor was necessary for Israeli security. Israel may also have violated UN Resolution 242 when it annexed the West Bank and Jerusalem (8:7).

For several years after it was formed, no Arab nation would recognize Israel's right to exist or negotiate with any Israeli diplomat. For this reason the Arab delegation walked out of a conference in Britain with the Jewish Agency in 1938. Although this attitude still exists, the more moderate Arab states now accept Israel's existence as permanent. Saudi Arabia's Fez Plan, publicized in August 1981, acknowledges Israel's right to exist although it does stress concessions which Israel must make if it wants peace with its Arab neighbors

airpower, air defense weapons, and heavy armored equipment. To help support its military and social programs, the PLO developed Samed, an economic organization which set up light industries and businesses in Lebanon that grossed over \$40 million in 1981. Part of this money was used for education, hospitals, and the PLO welfare program (31:5).

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon destroyed the PLO's infrastructure and fragmented PLO unity. Yassir Arafat, PLO leader for over 20 years, was driven from Lebanon with his supporters by a Syrian backed faction of the PLO. What will happen to Arafat now remains to be seen. He could align himself with moderate Arabs in the region which would probably be his best chance of retaining any authority. If he fails to do this, moderate states in the region, particularly Jordan, could use this opportunity to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians (23).

The Israeli Perception

Israel, like Jordan, sees itself as vulnerable, surrounded by radical enemies who have pledged their resources to its destruction. Indeed, the threat of war has faced Israel since its formation and forced the expenditure of large portions of Israel's resources on defense, leading to a 300 percent inflation rate.

The chief Israeli fear is a protracted 'wide-spread, coordinated attack on all of our borders' (39:9). Israelis believe this attack would come from Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and

possibly Saudi Arabia. Israel's Arab enemies now have extensive oil revenues to build up their military forces, and since 1973 these nations, plus Iran, have spent over \$60 billion for weapons, compared to Israel's \$16 billion. There is presently too much conflict among the Arab nations to stage a consolidated attack against Israel, although most Israelis believe that Arab countries will eventually overcome their differences and launch a united attack against them (39:8).

Due to their fear of attack, Israel annexed new territory to serve as buffer zones after the last two Mid East wars. The most important and controversial of these zones is the West Bank, the control of which is considered by Israeli officials as "crucial to the nation's security" (13:419). Since it is only eight miles from West Bank territories to the Mediterranean Sea, Israel fears a West Bank attack which could divide the nation and threaten its existence (39:9).

However, retaining the West Bank also creates problems for Israel. The population growth rate for Palestinian Arabs within Israeli controlled territory is much higher than Israeli population growth rates. The doubling time for Israeli Jews in this territory is 41 years, while for the Palestinians it is 19 years (39:9). Israelis fear this will change the characteristics of occupied territories and lead to further violence. Israelis must deal with repeated incidents of violence and rioting on the West Bank, particularly when Israel takes action unpopular with the Palestinians, such as the recent invasion of Lebanon. The West Bank has thus served as a perfect breeding ground for PLO

recruits (13:420).

One of the greatest threats to Israel is the PLO, which Israelis view as the major stumbling block to regional peace. Since the Six Day War in 1967 the PLO has increased its terrorist activities to gain publicity for the Palestinian cause and to disrupt Israeli society and force their government to maintain a large military which disrupts the economy. Some Israelis believe the PLO deliberately launched border attacks to provoke Israel to retaliate against Jordan and Lebanon, actions which resulted in unfavorable press coverage for Israel and a lessening of world wide support. Perhaps most significant, though, is the Israeli belief that the PLO is "unprepared to make peace with Israel under any circumstances" (13:418). Many believe that this is the real reason Israel invaded Lebanon: to break the PLO and open the way for a favorable settlement in the region (31:7; 1:37).

The Iran-Iraq war is another difficult situation with which Israel must deal. Long one of Israel's worse enemies, with the influx of oil money Iraq was becoming powerful as well. However, Iran is also Israel's enemy, particularly since the takeover by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The Ayatollah has openly pledged Iranian resources to aid its Muslim brothers in destroying Israel. In spite of this fact, Israel has been backing Iran in its war with Iraq (53:38).

Soviet Aims in the Mid-East

Since the early 1950s the Soviet Union has recognized

the strategic importance of the Middle East. Soviets rely on the Mediterranean not only for trade but for navy patrols that provide intelligence reports on NATO activity. The Suez Canal is also important to the Soviets because it provides a link to the Indian Ocean and is vital for trade and military purposes. Mid-East oil and gas are important to the Soviets for two reasons. It can augment their own supplies, but more importantly it gives them the opportunity to create major problems for its Western enemies which rely heavily on the region's oil (47:138).

The Soviet Union began seeking allies in the Mid-East in the mid-1950s. Colonialism was ending at that time and area nations were free to align themselves with whoever they wanted. Arab nationalism and pride were rising which made it easier for the Soviet Union to form ties and establish influence since Western nations were seen as imperialist exploitators and the driving force behind Israel. Egypt, Syria, and Yemen were the first Mid East nations to form close ties to the Soviets but other countries soon followed, attracted by the Soviet willingness to sell arms (47:139). In the early 1950s Iran was briefly controled by a pro-Soviet leader, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, who was later deposed with the help of the American Central Intelligence Agency.

The flow of arms from the Soviet Union to the Middle East increased steadily through the 1960s and by the 1970s was quite costly to the Soviet economy, with 7.5 percent of Soviet

conventional weapons going to Egypt alone. The transfer of arms opened the opportunity for the Soviet Union to set up military bases in the region, particularly in Egypt where the Soviets had 20,000 military advisors. However, relations with Egypt deteriorated when the Soviets tried to influence Egypt's political and police structure and to exert excessive pressure on the military. Egyptians were also annoyed at not receiving all the promised weapons and at the arrogant, frequently racist attitude of Soviet advisors. In July 1972 Soviet advisors were forced from Egypt, and four years later Anwar Sadat unilaterally dissolved the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (47:141).

After their expulsion from Egypt the Soviet Union concentrated on improving relations with Syria. However, Syrians have also been irritated with Soviet attempts to interfere in internal matters and have denied Soviet requests for naval and base rights. Syrian President Assad typically restricted the number of Soviet advisors he would allow in the country. However, recent fighting in Lebanon gave the Soviets the opportunity to move 5,000 additional military advisors into Syria (54:42). The Soviets have also been improving the quality of the military hardware which they send to Syria and other allies in the region with the aim of improving military capabilities and threatening Western links to the Persian Gulf.

The Soviets have publicly supported the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict in an attempt to gain further influence in the region. In fact, the Soviets have offered to sell arms to

any Arab nation which feels threatened by Israel. This has enticed even such moderate nations as Jordan which threatens to turn to the Soviets for weapons if the U.S. refuses to sell them first line equipment. In fact, Jordan has already bought SA-8 surface-to-air missiles and ZSU-23-4 radar-directed air defense guns from the Soviets (54:43).

The Iran-Iraqi war has provided another opportunity for the Soviets to extend their influence in the region. Three pro-Western nations are supporting Iraq in this conflict while three pro-Soviet nations are helping Iran, at this point the likely winner. North Korea, for example, is supplying Iran with airpower (54:43).

Jordan's Role

Most nations with interests in the Middle East have a role in their plans for Jordan. For Saudi Arabia, Jordan provides a buffer to help shield the Saudis from Israel and Syria. Jordan's central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict plus the fact that it is one of the few remaining Arab monarchies has tended to strengthen Saudi-Jordanian ties in spite of historic differences. King Hussein is a great-grandson of Sharif Hussein who was driven out of the Arabian Peninsula by the father of current Saudi rulers and antagonism persisted on both sides till less than a generation ago. In recent years, however, Saudi and Jordanian rulers have met frequently to discuss problems of mutual concern which has resulted in substantial Saudi military and economic aid to Jordan (49:24).

Syria would like to turn Jordan into an ally by destroying King Hussein and the Hashemite dynasty and eliminating Jordanian ties with the U.S. Evidence indicates that Syria was behind the assassination attempts on Jordanian Ambassadors in Athens and New Delhi, and a Syrian terrorist group was responsible for five recent bombings in Jordan. Jordan is militarily far weaker than Syria, and thus the Syrian threat is serious (12:30).

When pressured to give up the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to allow the formation of an independent Palestinian state, Israel has repeatedly claimed that a Palestinian state already exists in Jordan. Israel points to the fact that over 50% of Jordan's population is Palestinian, and Israeli actions have reinforced this point. Israel is accused of

Squeezing out the Arab residents of the West Bank at a rate of roughly 10,000 a year, and in ways which seem designed to push the most hostile and radical elements into Jordan and help make Jordan into a Palestinian state (12:30).

It would definitely be to Israel's advantage if Jordan were accepted as the Palestinian state since an independent Palestine would pose a constant threat to Israel.

The United States has tried to persuade Jordan to negotiate with Israel and act as regional peacemaker. According to the Christian Science Monitor the U.S. has already trained over 8000 Jordanian troops for use as a regional rapid deployment force. This could prove critical in protecting U.S. security interests and in providing needed training to Jordanian

forces (66). However, U.S. commitment to Jordan must increase substantially to convince Jordan to join the peace talks with Israel. U.S. officials have estimated that it will require an increase of \$700 million a year in U.S. aid to replace the Arab aid which Jordan would lose if it entered peace negotiations with Israel (12:30).

Islamic Resurgence and Jordan

An Islamic fundamentalist resurgence in Jordan would upset the entire balance of power in the Middle East, forcing nations to reevaluate their regional policies. Saudi Arabia in particular would be threatened by a fundamentalist regime in Jordan. Saudi Arabia follows a pure interpretation of Islam known as Wahhabi Islam which is closely adhered to by Saudi leaders. However, Wahhabi Islamic doctrine is widely ignored in daily life by much of the population. With an Islamic revival in much of the Muslim world, Saudi leaders are even more careful to follow strict Islamic doctrine to ensure the recognition of their rule as legitimate. However, the secularist Saudi population could create problems for the government by attracting the adverse attention of fundamentalists in neighboring area. (49:36).

One indication of the threat that would be posed to Saudi Arabia by a fundamentalist resurgence in Jordan is the Islamic Republic in Iran which has challenged Saudi Arabian rulers. The Ayatollah Khomeini has frequently stated that Islam and hereditary kingships are incompatible. This position incited

Shi'ite Muslims in Saudi Arabia and led to minor disturbances in Qatif in the Eastern Province in 1980. Other Saudis have been attracted to Khomeini's attacks on corruption and Western influence, and since 1980 Saudi Arabia has received broadcasts from Iran aimed at spreading Iran's brand of fundamentalism. These broadcasts begin with the Quranic verse 'Kings despoil a country when they enter it and make the noblest of its people its meanest' (49:39).

Iran's fundamentalists have been dealt with very cautiously by Saudi leaders who have emphasized that Saudi Arabia was also founded on Islamic values. Saudi Arabia's difficulties in dealing with Iran are only a fraction of those which would be encountered with a fundamentalist regime in Jordan. Jordan's proximity would be the major immediate threat, particularly since fundamentalists seem to be strongly opposed to monarchies. In addition to this direct threat, Saudi Arabia would be exposed to more fundamentalist propaganda which would increase internal problems. Saudi leaders would become far more careful in following Islamic principles and would want to put a greater distance between themselves and Western powers, particularly the United States.

An Islamic revival in Jordan would also be a severe blow to Israel which views even the current moderate state of Jordan as a dangerous enemy. A strong Islamic fundamentalist presence in Jordan would pose a significantly greater threat to Israel and would eliminate any chances of peace negotiations between the two nations. Islamic fundamentalists in Iran have pledged

their nation's resources to the destruction of Israel; fundamentalists in Jordan would have even stronger feelings against Israel, a fact which would increase Israeli paranoia and virtually eliminate chances of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Israel would be more unwilling than ever to tolerate "another" independent Palestine and would want to retain current buffer zones.

An Islamic fundamentalist resurgence in Jordan would also have a devastating affect on U.S. Mid East policy. To begin with, Jordan is one of the most moderate, pro-Western nations in the Middle East and has long been viewed by the U.S. as an important Mid East ally. Jordan is central to the success of the United State's current Mid East peace plan, and a fundamentalist resurgence in Jordan would remove them as a potential player in peace talks with Israel. This would force the United States to formulate a new Mid East plan. However, it is unlikely that the U.S. would be able to persuade any other moderate state to replace Jordan as a key player in the peace process with Israel. Tensions in the area would be high, and no nation would want to jeopardize their security by negotiating with Israel in conjunction with the United States.

A fundamentalist revival in Jordan would almost force the United States to sharply increase aid to Israel. Israeli security would be threatened by a fundamentalist regime right on its border, and more military aid would be required to protect Israeli sovereignty. The United States would also require the support of a strong pro-Western nation in the region to protect

U.S. security interests, and with the absence of Jordan as an ally and the reluctance of Saudi Arabia, Israel would be even more important as a U.S. ally.

Summary

The Middle East is extremely complex due to the conflicting security interests of its diverse religious groups and nations. The goals and views of Arab nations and the PLO are in sharp conflict with those of the Israelis. The U.S. is Israel's strongest financial supporter, leading Arabs to see conflicts with the U.S. role as regional peacemaker. Iran wants to spread its brand of Islamic fundamentalism, a goal that conflicts with Israeli, U.S., and moderate Arab goals. Finally, the Soviets are willing to take advantage of any regional instability to reinforce their presence in the area.

An Islamic fundamentalist resurgence in Jordan would further complicate an already complex situation. A Jordanian fundamentalist regime would be a definite threat to the royal family in Saudi Arabia which is considered pro-Western and moderate. Israel would become even more paranoid with a fundamentalist regime on its border, and the U.S. would have to formulate a new Mid East policy and reinforce its ties with Israel.

VI. Recommendations and Conclusions

Analysis

The United States has already made a number of serious errors in dealing with the Middle East, and it is important for U.S. officials to understand these mistakes before considering future action. Perhaps the worse mistake the U.S. made was in underestimating the Arab-Israeli situation. The U.S. made many promises after WWII assuring Arabs that no action would be taken to endanger their control and influence over Palestine, promises which the U.S. had no intention of keeping. U.S. officials evidently believed that a Jewish state could be formed in Palestine, and the Arab residents would disperse throughout the region and be assimilated by other countries. This has obviously not happened, nor is there any sign that it ever will. Of the four million Palestinians, over half are still registered as refugees with the UN Relief and Works Agency, and Jordan is the only Arab nation which will even accept Palestinians as citizens (64:173). Hatred of Israel is passed from one Palestinian generation to another and is widely taught in schools in the refugee camps. When one refugee child was asked why he liked Yassir Arafat he replied, 'Because he is fighting Zionism'. When then asked if he wasn't ashamed of someone like that who kills people he replied, 'No, because they killed my people and took my home' (21:171).

The U.S. underestimated the damage which would be done by

lying to the Arabs, particularly in one of the first official contacts between the U.S. and Middle East. The United States was soon viewed as a country which could not be trusted and which would support Israel no matter what the circumstances. The U.S. also underestimated the depth of feeling which would be aroused when the Palestinians were forced to leave their homeland. Islam was not recognized as a unifying force which would unite the Arab world behind their Muslim brothers in Palestine. U.S. officials did not understand the concept of umma, the community of Muslim believers, and are today still underestimating its influence.

The United States also may have erred at Camp David, by going against Sadat's wishes and treating the two frameworks for peace separately, even though dividing the issues resulted in Camp David's highly publicized if limited success. The primary achievement of Camp David was a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel which freed both sides from having to station large forces along their borders. However, it virtually ignored the entire Palestinian issue and thus placed President Sadat in a very precarious position. The Israeli-Egyptian settlement made Sadat look as though he betrayed the Palestinians. This angered the entire Arab world and particularly Islamic fundamentalists. It was an Islamic fundamentalist group that was behind the assassination of Sadat.

No progress has been made since Camp David on the second Egyptian-Israeli issue, that which would grant self government to the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, since Camp David, Israel

has violated the whole spirit of the peace process by accelerating Jewish settlements on the West Bank in an obvious ploy to retain control of the region. Sadat saw the Treaty of Peace as a framework for future settlements with Jordan, the PLO, and the Syrians, but Begin viewed it as an end in itself and had no desire to return any more territory. Israel removed its most powerful enemy as a potential threat and was thus far more reluctant to give up additional land to placate weaker enemies. If the United States had treated the two issues as closely linked, Egypt would have remained a threat to Israel until the West Bank/Palestinian issues were resolved, a fact which would have made Israel more open to the negotiation of these issues.

The United States was unpleasantly surprised when both Saudi Arabia and Jordan firmly rejected the Camp David agreement. According to the Camp David agreement, Jordan was to play a central role in negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and to help Israel maintain security during the transitional period. However, King Hussein announced that Jordan had no 'legal or moral commitments' to participate in a plan which Jordan 'played no part in discussing, formulating or approving' (64:201). In fact Hussein found the idea of maintaining security with Israel highly offensive and analogous to maintaining 'the security of the occupying power against the people under occupation' (64:207). The United States obviously should have consulted with Saudi Arabia and Jordan as the negotiations between Egypt and Israel

progressed. It is unrealistic to expect a nation to play a critical role in a plan in which it had no voice in formulating, and it should have been no surprise to the U.S. when Jordan and Saudi Arabia rejected the Camp David agreement.

U.S. failure to negotiate with the PLO is another policy mistake which has hindered settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. West Bank Palestinians seem unwilling to accept any settlement which is not negotiated with the PLO, as evidenced by the reaction of West Bank mayors after the Camp David agreement (13:416). Complicating the issue of U.S. recognition of the PLO is frequent change in Presidential Administrations and public opinion in the U.S. President Reagan, for example, is far less willing to negotiate with the PLO than President Carter was.

Internal political pressures and lack of national will have also led to U.S. ineffectiveness in the Middle East. The Israeli lobby exerts tremendous influence in American politics. This influence has led to an emphasis on Israeli security, over such U.S. goals as access to oil and the peaceful settlement of regional disputes (64:276). The American political system, Congress in particular, needs to be less sensitive to Israeli pressures and to take a more balanced view of the Mid East. When Israel launched major air strikes against Beirut with U.S. supplied aircraft, the U.S. delayed the shipment of F-16s to Israel. However, when events cooled down the planes were delivered, in spite of the fact that Israel had violated U.S.-Israeli arms agreements by using U.S. supplied equipment to attack Lebanon (64:40). This is just one example of how

influential the Israeli lobby has been in getting Congress to overlook Israeli violations of agreements and international law.

Recommendations

Presently, three outcomes to the Arab-Israeli conflict are possible: 1) Israel could maintain the status quo by the use of force, crush Palestinian nationalism, and refuse to give up any of the occupied territory. 2) Radical Arab states and factions of the PLO could destroy Israel and reestablish an independent Palestinian state. 3) Moderate forces could prevail, a compromise solution could be worked out, and Israel could trade land for peace. The U.S. should aim for the later outcome.

Numerous plans have been made by moderate Arab states and the U.S. for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These plans agree on certain major points, including the Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 War, some Arab control over Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and freedom of worship for all religions in the holy shrines, an end to hostile actions against Israel and the guarantee of peace on both sides of the conflict, by UN forces if necessary, and Palestinian self-determination on the West Bank and Gaza. Some disagreement does exist as to the degree of Palestinian self-determination. Under the Fez Plan approved by the Arab League, self-determination includes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, under President Reagan's plan self-determination means self-government for Palestinians

of the West bank and Gaza in association with Jordan (50:33). Reagan's plan would basically make the Palestinians subordinate to the Hashemite dynasty which would be more acceptable to Israel. A self-governing Palestine with strong ties to Jordan would probably create more stability in the region, and the U.S. should support this, as well as the other goals supported by moderate Arab states.

In order for any settlement on the Arab-Israeli conflict to be reached, the United States would have to exert considerable pressure on Israel, which has shown no inclination to make any concessions since the Camp David agreement. In the past, U.S. officials have seemed unwilling to apply any pressure on Israel or to use the threat of withholding U.S. aid to force Israel into making concessions. No U.S. President has applied strong pressure on Israel since 1957 when President Eisenhower threatened to support UN sanctions against Israel and to tax private contributions to Israel by U.S. citizens if Israel refused to withdraw from the Sinai and Gaza Strip (64:287). This threat was quite effective but fear of Congress and the Israeli lobby have inhibited all other Presidents from taking similar action. The U.S. President must act independently of any special interest groups if the U.S. is to be effective in seeking a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Although fear of domestic political pressure may be a motive, there is another explanation for the reluctance of U.S. Presidents to exert pressure on Israel by withholding economic or military aid. A common belief among U.S. officials is that a

militarily strong Israel is far more likely to negotiate with the Arab nations than a militarily weak Israel. It has been argued that Israel was willing to negotiate with Egypt at Camp David because it was negotiating from a position of strength. However, a more likely explanation is that the Begin government wanted a peaceful settlement with its most powerful enemy. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State under Richard Nixon, was one of those who believed that Israel would be more willing to negotiate if it were strong militarily, and yet even Kissinger admitted that 'I ask Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can't because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and he says he doesn't need to make concessions because Israel is strong' (64:284).

This lack of willingness by U.S. Presidents to apply pressure on Israel has impeded the Arab-Israeli peace process and has reduced the U.S.'s ability to influence regional events. When Presidents Carter and Reagan constantly stated that they would not use U.S. military aid to put pressure on Israel, they freed Israel to take whatever action it desires, even if these actions violate international law and are contrary to American regional interests. The Israeli bombing of Beirut is a classic example. The U.S. condemned the action and delayed the delivery of F-16s to Israel, but the planes were eventually delivered and Israel suffered no detrimental effects as a result of their actions. As long as U.S. Presidents are unwilling to apply pressure on Israel, the Israelis will be free to use force wherever they choose and will have little reason to negotiate

or make concessions.

U.S. diplomats will have to convince other nations to negotiate as well. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Palestinian representatives must participate in any negotiations with Israel if they are to be successful. The U.S. must not repeat the mistakes of Camp David by not including all affected parties. Once negotiations are complete, the United States must ensure the security of nations affected, particularly Israel and Jordan. A peace keeping force would probably be required on the Israeli-Palestinian border for some time, and both sides would be required to sign non-aggression agreements. In addition, security measures would have to be taken to protect both sides from outside groups who opposed the settlement. For example, radical factions of the PLO would oppose any settlement with Israel and would be a continued threat to Israeli existence.

Recent events have created new opportunities for the United States to advance its plan for regional peace. Fighting in Lebanon resulted in a fragmented PLO when Yassir Arafat and his supporters were driven out of Tripoli. Since then Arafat has met with Egyptian President Mubarak and plans shortly to meet with King Hussein to discuss Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Arafat naturally lost a lot of power with the division of the PLO. However, he was leader of that organization for over 20 years and is the one person recognized as a leader by the Palestinians on the West Bank. At this point two things could happen if Arafat supports a central role for Jordan in the peace process. Arafat's supporters could

remain loyal and back his plans for Jordan or some could rebel, further dividing the PLO. If the later happens it will further complicate the Mid East peace process.

Events in Israel have also increased opportunities for the U.S. Israel's huge defense budget and continued expansion in occupied territories place a tremendous burden on the Israeli economy, leading to runaway inflation which this year is expected to top 300 percent. Israel's minister of finance has therefore proposed a halt on further West Bank settlements which is what the PLO and Arab nations have wanted all along. The U.S. has frequently condemned Israeli expansion on the West Bank but has taken no action to convince Israel to halt further settlement. Now is a good opportunity for U.S. negotiators to push for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank by making further economic aid contingent on Israeli cooperation.

The U.S. will have to increase aid to Jordan if Jordan is to be convinced to participate in any peace negotiations with Israel. Jordan has moved from Military Assistance to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) when acquiring weapon systems from the United States (See Chapter 4). Aid from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries has permitted Jordan to switch to FMS. However, if Jordan began negotiations with Israel, this aid would undoubtedly stop, and Jordan would be more isolated and vulnerable than ever. U.S. officials have estimated that it will require an increase of \$700 million a year in U.S. aid to replace the Arab aid Jordan will lose if it enters negotiations with Israel. This step would ensure Jordanian security if the

U.S. wants Jordan to play a central role in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Conclusions

The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world, racked with numerous conflicts which keep it in constant political upheaval. This thesis examined the history of the Islamic religion to determine how Islam affects the present situation in the Middle East. It also examined Jordan's history and relationships with Western nations and how Jordan is affected by Muslim fundamentalism. To accomplish the research objectives listed in chapter one, the three research questions are listed and discussed in the following section.

Research Question One

How do the political/social aspects of the Islamic religion affect the political stability of Jordan?

The Muslim faith considers church and state a single entity. Each Muslim country is supposed to be guided by the Qur'an in domestic and international affairs. Muslim nations are required by the Qur'an to ignore national differences and to work together to project a united front in foreign affairs. In reality, however, nationalistic self-interest has proven stronger than religious cooperation. In spite of this trend, the Arab countries have occasionally united behind a common cause. One example of this unity was the response to the founding of Israel and the Palestinians loss of their homeland.

Arab countries united and invaded Israel, trying to regain the Palestinian land.

The past few years has witnessed a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, most notably in Iran and among Shi'ite communities in other countries. Fundamentalists require strict adherence to the Qur'an, and in a fundamentalist nation like Iran the caliph is also the nation's political leader. A fundamentalist caliph like the Ayatollah Khomeini has tremendous power to determine the course of his nation, and his followers willingly die for him, believing that they will receive the highest place of honor in heaven. Fundamentalist groups in other countries also have tremendous power to influence their governments, primarily by using terrorist bombings and assassinations, many of which are suicide missions. This naturally influences even the most moderate regimes, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which must consider fundamentalist views when formulating foreign policy. King Hussein in particular is in a difficult position. The U.S. is pressuring Hussein to negotiate with Israel but to do so would make him vulnerable to fundamentalist attacks. Although Jordan is a very stable country, it is definitely constrained by Islamic fundamentalism.

Research Question Two

What effect would a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan have on U.S. defense assistance to Jordan?

Jordan, and more specifically the Hashemite dynasty, faces

a definite threat from Islamic fundamentalists, both internally and externally. A wide spread resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan would undoubtedly lead to the severing of ties with the U.S. and other Western nations. Jordan now acquires all weapon systems from the U.S. under the foreign military sales program and is no longer receiving U.S. defense assistance. Therefore only FMS contracts would be affected. There is little doubt, though, that Jordan would terminate these FMS contracts if it were dominated by Islamic fundamentalists, just as Iran ended their FMS contracts with the U.S. after the Ayatollah Khomeini assumed control of the country.

When Iran canceled its FMS program with the United States it created serious new problems for the U.S. There were few guidelines on correct procedure for terminations, and the volume of cases alone created difficulties. Weapon systems that were complete were sold to other countries when buyers could be found, and in some cases the U.S. itself bought the equipment. Revenue from these sales were placed in a trust fund out of which payments were made to contractors. Lack of accurate, current data was a continual problem, and there was no central office of responsibility. Fortunately, many lessons were learned from the Iranian cancelation, and steps were taken to prevent many of these problems from arising in the future. New guidelines require that each program's history be kept on the Defense Security Assistance Agency's computer. Steps were also taken to reduce paperwork (27:88). These changes would undoubtedly reduce the problems which would result if Jordan

canceled FMS contracts with the U.S.

Research Question Three

What effect would a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan have on U.S. Mid East foreign policy?

A resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan would have a devastating affect on U.S. Mid East policy and would require the U.S. to make drastic policy changes. If Jordan were dominated by fundamentalists the U.S. would lose one of the most moderate, pro-Western nations in the region, and one which is central to President Reagan's Mid East peace plan. It is unlikely the U.S. would be able to persuade any other moderate state to replace Jordan in the peace process with Israel. No other nation in the region would want to jeopardize their security by negotiating with Israel with a fundamentalist regime so close. This would force the U.S. to substantially increase aid to Israel, both to protect Israeli sovereignty and to help protect U.S. regional security interests. With the absence of Jordan as a U.S. ally and the increased caution of other moderate regimes, Israel would be even more important as a U.S. ally.

Appendix: UN Resolution 242

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting

The Security Council/

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible (44:338).

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